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ABSTRACT

As the elected president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez has undertaken a different type of
economic and political agenda - one that presents a challenge to American - led neoliberalism
and one which represents one nation's struggle towards a socialist project. In April 2002, there
was a successful, yet short-lived, coup against Chavez. Many believe that the coup was heavily
supported and financed by the Bush administration and the National Endowment for Democracy,
an organization that serves the interests of American imperialism. Using Edward Herman and
Noam Chomsky's Propaganda Model in conJunction with Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis
critically examines the media coverage of the 2002 coup in the New York Times and the Globe
and Mail.
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CHAPTERl
HUGO CHAVEZ AND VENEZUELA:
HISTORICAL AND POLICITICAL CONTEXT
The alternative that inspires the fight for change may be vague and naive, but in
the course of struggle that alternative is clarified, new questions and further
clarifications are forced to the surface. There is the discovery, amongst those
searching for a new society, of new capacities, both individual and collective, that
people never realize they had. The issue, therefore, is less the absence of a
comprehensive alternative, than the,, emergence of growing frustration with the
status quo, combined with a commitment to a vision rooted in an alternative
notion of social justice and confidence that the individual and organizational
capacities to bring that vision to life can be developed (Gindin, 2003, p.17).
Chavez's 1992 Coup: Economic and Social Factors

Hugo Chavez, the elected president of Venezuela, has become a political icon for many
people searching for an alternative to the neo-liberal economic agenda that has come to dominate
many world political systems. "It is undeniable that Chavez, a rural man of mixed racial
background, has become a symbol ofrevolt against U.S. political and economic interests
throughout the hemisphere" (Kozloff, 2006, p.3). Under the leadership of President Hugo
Chavez, Venezuela has undertaken a different type of economic and political project. The
Venezuelan "experiment" has tried to redistribute some of the country's rich oil wealth and
implement structural changes that will improve the social and economic conditions of the
country's poor majority. For students interested in political change, the situation in Venezuela
may be construed as an exciting example of one nation's struggle toward a socialist project that
foregrounds peoples' needs. Although the Chavez government does not have all of the answers
to implementing an inclusive, popular democracy with an egalitarian, socialist state, it appears to
be willing to struggle with the fundamental questions.
Petras (2008, para3 7) suggests that in order to "discuss the highly polarized social
confrontation between the pro-Chavez popular movements and the US-backed oligarch-
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supported middle class movements, it is important to contextualize the social, political and
economic relations, which preceded the ascendancy of the Chavez government". Petras also
contends "the United States was the key determinant of the economic conditions and the
principle point of reference of Venezuela 's oligarchy and middle class" and that "USV enezuelan relations were based on US hegemony in all spheres - from oil to consumerism,
from sports to life style, from bank accounts to marriage partners" (Ibid). Therefore in what
follows, I examine the economic social and historical factors which led to Chavez's presidency.
Since the overthrow of the nine-year military dictatorship of General Marcos Perez
Jimenez in 1958, Venezuela has long been promoted as a model democracy in Latin America.
The idea of Venezuela being an 'exceptional democracy' was buoyed by three underlying
conditions. First, Venezuela was viewed as a privileged society in relation to the rest of Latin
America. Second, Venezuela had not experienced acute class and racial conflicts that may have
threatened political stability. Finally, Venezuela had a stable and established democratic and
political system (Ellner & Salas, 2006). During the 1970's the Venezuelan people saw a steady
improvement in their standard ofliving due to the 'oil boom' and the expansion of the petroleum
rents (Lander, 2006). The changes in material conditions occurred even though there were no
major shifts in the pattern of income distribution. "Social indicators reflecting education levels,
health standards, life expectancy, access to housing and public services, infant mortality, and
employment (including levels of formal employment) all registered significant improvement"
(Lander, 2006, p.21 ). The Venezuelan people began to have expectations of sustained growth
and improved living conditions. Many believed that Venezuela was on its way to becoming a
"modem integrated society" (Lander, 2006, p21 ).
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In the J980' s and 1990' s, the reality of a deteriorating political system and the deep class
and socio-economic divisions that resulted began to debunk the myth of Venezuela as an
'exceptional democracy' (Ellner & Salas, 2006). The mid-l 980's illustrated how divided
Venezuelan society had become with greater income disparity, gated communities, high levels of
violence, racial tensions and an expanding lower class (Ellner & Salas, 2006). "According to
one estimate, total poverty in the country nearly doubled between 1984 and 1991, from 3 6
percent of the population to 68 percent" (Martel, 1993, cited in Lander, 2006, p.18). These
social and economic conditions created an increasingly divided society resulting in segregation
and class distinction, particularly in urban areas. This period of severe economic decline and
marginalization of the country's poor majority led to public dissatisfaction with how the country
was run under President Carlos Andres Perez.
Although President Perez campaigned for election using an anti-neoliberal platform,
shortly after his election he attempted to implement 'the paquete' or 'package' of free market
reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMP). These austerity measures were
directly in line with the 'Washington Consensus' and included privatizing state companies, tax
reforms, and diminishing the role of the state in managing the economy. 1 For the Venezuelan
people, these economic initiatives meant "stagnating incomes in the face of skyrocketing prices
and monetary devaluation" (Ciccariello-Maher, 2007, para 3). Dissatisfaction with the Perez
government turned to outrage, when as a result of the economic measures, petrol prices rose by
100% and public transportation costs increased by 30% (Ciccariello-Maher, 2007). Rioting, seen
as the worst in Venezuela's history, began in Guarenas, near the capital city of Caracas, and
spread across the country. The incident, referred to as the 'Caracazo,' has been identified as a
1

The Washington Consensus is a standard set of economic policy mandates that economist John Williamson
developed for implementation in 'third world' countries. The policies focus on trade liberalization, privatization of
state enterprises, property rights and deregulation ofrestriction on capital in the marketplace (Nairn, 2000).
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historic uprising against the modem neoliberal agenda although, not as recognized as the protests
in Seattle 1999, or the Zapatista's movement of 1994 (Ciccariello-Maher, 2007).
In an attempt to explain the motives behind the riots, Marquez (2003) argues that "the
poor and the marginalized residents of the shantytowns, as well as many considered middle class,
were no longer passively accepting price inflation, food shortages and the collapse of social
;'

services" (p.201). The uprising continued for three days and up to five days in some areas. In
response, President Perez called for martial law, suspended constitutional rights, established a
curfew, and brought in the military to use force to suppress the people (Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 1999). Military personnel, who had been trained to defend the country against
foreign threats were now ordered by the government to tum their guns against civilians. This
had a profound effect on the consciousness of the military, many of whom came from poor
sectors of the population. In some areas of the country, police and military fired openly and
indiscriminately into crowds or at homes in poor neighbourhoods. Initial reports stated that
approximately 300 people were killed, mainly civilians. Weeks later, mass graves were found
containing bodies bringing the death toll into the thousands, as estimated by medical personnel.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the government had committed
numerous human rights violations, including extra judicial killings. The events of the Caracazo
changed the Venezuelan political landscape and gave birth to a "constituent power" as the people
rose up against oppressive government measures (Hernandez, 2004, p. 140). In many ways, the
Caracazo changed the political consciousness of the Venezuelan people and prepared them for
the military coup of 1992 and the eventual election of Hugo Chavez.
The current political situation in Venezuela centres on the leader of the 'Bolivarian
movement' and president of the country, Hugo Chavez. Chavez was born in the town of
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Sabaneta, Bari!las a poor child of two school teachers. In his late teens he enrolled in the
Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences, and upon graduating, entered active military service
as part of a counter insurgency battalion. It was during his time in the army that he became
politicized, and together with fellow students developed a left-nationalist ideology based on the
teachings of Simon Bolivar. Bolivar was the famed 19th century Venezuelan revolutionary who
led many South American countries to liberation from their historic colonizers. In 1983, Chavez,
together with fellow military officers, formed a political party - the Revolutionary Bolivarian
Movement 200 or MBR-200.
On February 4t\ 1992, Chavez and a group of military officers who were part ofMBR200 attempted a military coup against the government of Carlos Andres Perez. Their goals were
to gain control of the country by seizing President Perez and to eventually take over major
military barracks and communications instillations. An important aspect of the coup plot was to
broadcast pre-recorded messages to the masses and call for a national uprising. Chavez and his
group were able to gain control of some large, important cities such as Valencia, Maracaibo, and
Maracay, but were unable to control Caracas. Betrayals within the ranks of the group and some
unforeseen circumstances left Chavez surrounded by government forces with no way to
communicate with his network of allies. Acknowledging defeat, Chavez negotiated his surrender
with the condition that he could broadcast a televised message to his co-conspirators asking them
to abandon the coup. Although Chavez had been captured, some of his military colonels were
reluctant to concede defeat as they had control of important military barracks and major regions.
Chavez asked the military officers to 'stand down' because the objectives of the coup had not
been attained 'for now,' "por abora." The Venezuelan people were inspired by his speech
because Chavez took full responsibility for the coup, yet showed determination by suggesting

5

that he was onJy defeated 'for now.' Venezuelans, having witnessed years of political corruption
were not accustomed to politicians who were accountable for their actions. This famous speech
is said to have launched Chavez's political career and endeared him to the masses of poor
people. After spending two years in Yare prison, Chavez was finally pardoned in 1994 by
President Rafael Caldera. Once released Chavez reconstituted the MBR-200 as the Fifth
Republic Movement (MVR- Movimento Quinta Republica).
Chavez's Election

To understand the political factors that led to Chavez's election one must consider the
country's political development in historical context. In 1958, after the defeat of General Marcos
Perez Jimenez, political parties opposing the military dictatorship united to draft the Punto Fijo
Pact. The Punto Fijo Pact, signed by politicians, created a system where political power was
concentrated in the hands of the country's two main political parties, the Democratic Action
Party (AD), and the Christian Democrat's Independent Political Electoral Organizing Committee
(COPEi) (Marcano and Tyszka, 2004/2007). This bi-party system had a stabilizing effect in
allowing the Venezuelan democratic system to develop and warded off coup d' etats throughout
the tumultuous 1960's and 1970's. Conversely, it limited political party politics to a narrow,
predominantly conservative, spectrum. The 'pact democracy' shut all "other political parties out
of participation, and created a system of patronage [with] high levels of corruption" (James,
2006, para 2).
In 1998, Chavez began campaigning for the presidency of Venezuela based on a
nationalist, anti-corruption, anti-poverty platform. Chavez envisioned an autonomous Venezuela
that was not beholden to other countries or international organizations. Another important tenet
of his campaign was to call for the elimination of the bi-party political system, which Chavez
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referred to as 'forty years of corrupt democracy.' The election campaign appealed to the
country's poor majority and to a substantial sector of the middle class who were "fed up with the
incompetence and corruption of the previous administration" (Marcano & Tyska, 2004/2007,
p.5). More importantly, people were disillusioned with a political system that preached
democracy yet ignored the extreme social and economic conditions of the poor majority.
As the social and economic fabric of the country began to disintegrate Venezuelan
society became more polarized. At the time of the election, Venezuela was experiencing a
recession that claimed more than 350,000 jobs while 2400 businesses faced closure or near
bankruptcy. Working people saw a decline in their living standards with purchasing power cut to
one-third of what it was 20 years prior and a sense of insecurity became generalized within the
population (Lander, 2006; Van, 1998). An extreme increase in the poverty rate and mass
unemployment created a profound change in Venezuelan culture (Lander, 2006). A culture of
violence began to develop and people feared for their personal safety. As a result "countless
streets in the middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods were closed and privatized" and gated
communities were established in urban areas (Lander, 2006, p.22). The poor were portrayed as a
"dangerous class" particularly by the private media that would accentuate this point using racist
overtones (Lander, 2006, p.22).
The social and economic conditions of the country were acknowledged and addressed
through Chavez' s campaign. The poor supported Chavez' s populist ideas while the middle class
were seen as casting 'protest votes' against the previous government (Petras, 2008). It was the
middle classes who largely elected Chavez based on their disillusionment with the previous
government which had allowed them to slip into poverty over a period of 20 years (Wilpert,
2007). Although, Chavez was largely supported by the poor, the middle and upper classes were
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registered as voters in far higher proportion (Wilpert, 2007). When the ballots were finally
counted, Chavez had won the election with 56.44 percent of the vote. His election signified the
collapse of Venezuela's two party system as people rejected the traditional parties and elected a
proverbial outsider.
Chavez's Presidency

James suggests that this "context of social, political and economic polarization created
the political space for a new vision of the country based on social equality, political participation
and economic development that gave birth to the Bolivarian project" (2006, para 2).
Chavez's presidency, to this point, has not resulted in the revolution that his political
rhetoric once suggested would take place. The goal of the Bolivarian Revolution is a 'third way'
toward twenty-first century socialism, yet it has not been able to completely eliminate the
capitalist system. In order to increase the state's control of the economy, the government has
nationalized strategic enterprises specifically in the oil and gas industries, steel, cement, food
production and distribution (Petras, 2008). State ownership of key industries allowed for an
increase in revenues deposited into the treasury; financing investment, social programs, and the
ownership of associated processing plants and services (Petras, 2008). Critics of the Chavez
administration also suggest that he has shied away from taxing the wealth of the country's elite.
More broadly, the risk of capital flight has hindered Chavez's fight against foreign
multinationals. In many areas of the country, poor people are still victims of crime, corruption
and food shortages, due to hoarding and price speculation. The changes in law and policy that
have been made by the Bolivarian Revolution have been admirable but there is considerable
work to be done before there is a permanent change in economic structure and overall
consciousness.
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While being realistic about the limits of economic transformation that has taken place, we
must acknowledge that the Bolivarian process has achieved accomplishments worthy of
recognition. One of Chavez's first acts as president was to begin the process of writing a new
constitution that reflected his agenda and the needs of the Venezuelan people. In April 1999, 88
percent of the people voted via popular referendum to convene a Constituent Assembly, an
elected body that would be responsible for writing the new constitution (James, 2006). As a
result of Chavez's overall popularity, of the 125 representatives who were elected, 95 percent
were allied with the president's political project (Wilpert, 2003). The new constitution, approved
by voters with 72 percent popular approval, changed the name of the country to the "Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela," acknowledging the role of Simon Bolivar in liberating many South
American countries (James, 2006). The constitution changed various government structures and
responsibilities, including the addition of both a citizen's branch and an electoral branch to the
existing legislative, executive and judiciary bodies. Human rights were expanded to include
social rights, such as, the right to education, health care, a clean environment and cultural rights
for indigenous peoples. Citizens gained the power to change the constitution via referendum, to
abrogate laws or to recall the president or other elected officials (Wilpert, 2003 ).
Although the 'Bolivarian' constitution is viewed as one of the most progressive in the
world there have been some common criticisms lodged against it. One unsettling charge was
that the constitution strengthened the military's role in Venezuelan society and centralized
presidential power (Wilpert, 2003 ). The clause allowing the president to rule by decree in
specific areas has been identified as potentially dictatorial (Sustar, 2007). The power of the
presidential decree is tempered by the fact that the National Assembly has the right to make
revisions and all decrees are subject to review by the Supreme Court. In general, the overall
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popularity of the constitution is evident in its high ratification rate, a 72 to 28 margin and the fact
that it is sold in miniature form on almost every street comer of major cities (Jones, 2007). In
pro-government groups, such as the Bolivarian Circles, people read and study the constitution something that can not be said about previously written constitutions (Wilpert, 2007)2. The 1999
constitution not only resonates with the country's poor, it is also used as the framework for
policy reform under the Bolivarian political project. In other words, "the 1999 constitution has
become more than 'just' a constitution. It is a political project towards which pro-Chavez
Venezuelans want to move the society" (Wilpert, 2007, p.43).
Since becoming leader of the country, Chavez has faced challenges to his presidency that
have resulted in temporary instability and economic uncertainty. The April 2002 coup, followed
by a strike/lockout in the oil industry and an attempted recall referendum have all been linked to
U.S. interests. Yet in the face of U.S. interference and imperialism, Chavez has been able to
implement programs that have benefited the Venezuelan people. Many aspects of the Chavez
presidential agenda are carried out through fourteen fundamental social programs or 'missions.'
The missions are a series of social welfare, poverty elimination, education, electoral and military
recruiting programs. Overall, these programs have established thousands of public medical and
dental clinics; launched massive literacy and higher education initiatives; subsidized food,
gasoline, and other consumer goods; and assisted in the formation of numerous worker-managed
manufacturing and industrial cooperatives. Funding for the social programs comes
predominantly from the country's rich oil industry. Critics question if the country will be able to
support such social programs if there is a drop in the high oil prices that have led to the current
cash windfall.

2

Bolivarian Circles are autonomous, grassroots, political groups dedicated to protecting and advancing the
Bolivarian Revolution (Chaves & Burke, 2003).
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The Forty-Eight Hour Coup
Approximately four years after his initial election, there was a successful, yet short-lived,
coup against President Chavez. The coup was led by right-wing political parties, corrupt labour
leaders, corporate interests, media moguls, and some high ranking military officers (Gollinger,
2008; Hamecker, 2005). The coup was directed, not only against the president himself, but was
an attempt to overturn the entire political project of the 'Bolivarian Revolution.'
The week leading up to the coup was filled with demonstrations and anti-government
propaganda. Venevision, one of the country's main television stations, owned by Gustavo
Cisnero, substituted inflammatory anti-Chavez messages for its regular programming and was
eventually ordered off the air. Cisnersos played an important role in the coup plot, meeting with
U.S. officials and allegedly financing a portion of the affair. On the day prior to the coup, key
Venezuelan political and business figures met with the U.S. ambassador at the Cisneros mansion
and later at Venevision headquarters (Kozloff, 2006). One of the people present at the meetings
with the Ambassador was Pedro Carmona Estanga, who would eventually be installed as the
temporary coup president.
The events of the actual coup sprang from a demonstration, on April 11 th, organized by
anti-Chavez forces. Violence escalated outside the Presidential Palace and gunmen opened fire
on protesting crowds, resulting in 15 people being killed and 157 injured. Initially, the gunmen
were thought to have been pro-Chavez militia ordered by the president to fire at unarmed antigovernment demonstrators. It was later shown that most of the people who where killed were
pro-Chavez demonstrators shot by roof top snipers (Power, 2002). This incident was used as
provocation by opposition instigators to ask the president to step down, and when that was not
successful, to initiate a coup (Woods, 2005).
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Militar; personnel arrived at the palace, arrested the President and transferred him to an
isolated Venezuelan island. Pedro Carmona Estanga, president of Fedecamars (The Venezuelan
Chamber of Commerce), declared himself the new interim president of Venezuela. Carmona' s
first act as president was to dissolve the National Assembly. He also abrogated the 1999
constitution, repealed key economic laws, and removed pro-Chavez mayors and Supreme Court
judges. Such sweeping reforms were not part of the initial coup strategy and splintered the
previously unified coup coalition (Smith, 2005; Woods, 2005).
When news of the coup reached the poor barrios, people took to the streets to protest the
removal of 'their' president and the installation of a new government. In addition, some
Generals denounced the Carmona government and many low ranking military personnel
remained loyal to the president - refusing orders of anti-Chavez Generals. When information
that Chavez had not resigned reached his supporters they filled the streets, surrounded the palace,
rallied and protested for Chavez' s return. After 48 hours they were able to pressure the coup
government to reinstate the democratically elected president, Hugo Chavez. Private Venezuelan
media did not cover the swell of support for Chavez or the events that led to the reversal of the
coup. Instead they chose to broadcast a day-long marathon of American films resulting in a
virtual media black out.
The initial response to the coup from the international community varied greatly. Of
particular interest is the reaction of U.S. government bureaucrats who stated that "Chavez had it
coming" and that the coup was a result of his "anti-democratic behaviour" (Clement, 2006,
p.196). In stark contrast to the U.S. reaction, the 19 nations of the Rio Group of Latin American
countries issued a statement condemning the "interruption of constitutional order" in Venezuela
(Smith, 2005, p.132). More specifically, both Argentina and Paraguay referred to the Carmona
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leadership as

a_q

illegal government. Additionally, the President of Mexico, Vincente Fox, would

not recognize the government unless elections were held. A few days after the coup, U.S.
officials acknowledged having had some contact with the coup plotters in the months prior to the
actual coup (Smith, 2005). The U.S. denied overtly supporting the coup, yet documentation later
emerged suggesting that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) had been funnelling
hundreds of thousands of dollars to anti-Chavez organizations.

American Foreign Policy and Venezuela
Post WWII relations between the United States and Venezuela were characterized as
being of mutual friendship and cooperation. In The United States and Venezuela: Rethinking a

Relationship, the authors discuss bilateral relations between the two nations as being based on
four premises (Kelly & Romero, 2002). First, Venezuela was regarded as a trustworthy trading
partner and oil supplier. Venezuela is the fifth largest supplier of oil in the world and the fourth
largest supplier of oil to the United States (Kozloff, 2006). Venezuela is also listed as the
nineteenth largest trading partner to the United States and receives forty-five percent of its
imports from the United States (Kozloff, 2006). Second, Venezuela was recognized by the
United States as having political and economic stability when compared to other South American
countries which experienced violence, political unrest and turmoil. Third, political relations
between the two countries were based on mutual co-operation, versus conflict. When the United
States led the crusade against communism, Venezuela, which was not a major player on the
world scene, managed to stay neutral on issues of invasion and generally kept a low political
profile. Lastly, there was a mutual understanding between the two countries that neither party
would interfere in the regional or global affairs of the other.

13

In the early 1990's the relationship between the United States and Venezuela became
somewhat strained as the Venezuelan economy was declining in the face of U.S. growth.
Venezuelan society began to question the "validity" of what was perceived "as the American
model of global economy" (Kelly & Romero, 2002, p.94). The relationship between the two
countries had become difficult due to Venezuela's redefinition of its own security outside of the
traditional role as a United States protectorate. Although relations were strained and political
posturing continued the "broad fabric of the bilateral relation remained intact" due to the
common trade interests of both countries (Kelly & Romero, 2002, p.95).
When Chavez was first elected in 1998 he initially experienced the same kind of
ambivalent, trade based U.S. policy toward Venezuela. "It wasn't until George W. Bush arrived
at the White House in 2000 that relations between Venezuela and the United States took a tum
for the worse" (Golinger, 2008, p.14). One must wonder why Hugo Chavez, the democratically
elected president of Venezuela is viewed as such a threat to the United States. He does not have
weapons of mass destruction and has not declared war on the U.S. Nevertheless, Hugo Chavez
is an influential member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and he
supports the strategy of OPEC members to decrease oil output and maintain high oil prices. This
stands in the way of U.S. government interests which would like to have the ability to manipulate
oil prices thereby controlling an important aspect of the global economy (McQuaig, 2004 ). In
addition, Chavez has strengthened the constitutional ban on the privatization of the state oil
company, PDVSA - Petr6leos de Venezuela Sociedad An6nima (Blum, 2004). The previous 60year agreement taxed foreign oil companies as little as a one percent royalty while still allowing
them tax breaks (Talbot, 2002). In order to continue his populist agenda, Chavez was required to
change the way the country managed its rich oil resource. The changes angered the giant
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transnational oil corporations and business interests which would have preferred to see the oil
industry privatized. In "Coup making in Venezuela: The Bush and oil factor", the author argues
that one of the underlining motives of the failed April 2002 coup was an attempt to "privatize
PDVSA, turning it over to a U.S. company linked to President George Bush and the Spanish
company Repsol; plus the sale of CITGO, the U.S. subsidiary of PDVSA, to Gustavo Cisemos
and his partners in the north; as well as an end to the Venezuelan government's exclusive subsoil
rights" (Talbot, 2002). By initiating the reversal of the traditional oil policy, which previously
held the oil wealth in the hands of an elite few, Chavez became an important enemy of the Bush
administration (Kozloff, 2006, p.5).
The United States is the "largest and most technologically advanced economy in the
world" yet it is totally dependant on fossil fuel (Kem, 2006, para 8). Although the United States
accounts for 5 percent of the world population, it consumes more oil than any other country in
the world, approximately 25 percent of global daily consumption (Kem, 2006). Holding 3
percent of the world's proven oil reserves the U.S. is dependent on foreign oil producers to
satisfy its insatiable demand (Kem, 2006). Currently, 60 percent of the oil used in the U.S. is
imported and this is expected to grow to 70 percent by the year 2025 (Kem, 2006). The reliance
on imported oil is one of the main factors influencing American foreign and military policy.
"The use of military power to protect the flow of oil has been a central tenet of U.S. foreign
policy since 1945, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised King Abdulaziz of Saudi
Arabia that the United States would protect the kingdom in return for special access to Saudi oil"
(Kem, 2006, para 4). In more contemporary times, the United States has used its military to
protect supply routes, prop up friendly regimes, overthrow adversarial leaders and install
compliant governments.
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Chavez's Criticism of U.S. Foreign Policy and Trade
Chavez drew further attention from the U.S. government due to his open criticism of
American foreign policy. Chavez publicly condemned the war with Afghanistan, stating it was
"fighting terrorism with terrorism" (Blum, 2002, p.1). He denounced the 'War on Iraq' declaring
it a bombing campaign and not a war (Blum, 2002). Regarding Venezuela's relationship with
Cuba, Chavez supported Cuba at the United Nations, directly petitioned President Clinton to end
the embargo and opposed the Helms-Burton Law (Romero, 2002)3. Furthermore, Chavez has
repeatedly denied the American government's request to enter Venezuelan air space to pursue
the initiatives of Plan Colombia and 'the war on drugs' 4 .
Chavez openly opposed the U.S.-backed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).
In an interview he was quoted as saying, that the "FTAA is the path to Hell" for South America
(Palast, 2003, para 6). Venezuela's position on the FTAA was "one of the main issues leading to
acute confrontation" between the two nations (Lander, 2006, p.18). In Quebec City, at the Third
Summit of the Americans in 2001, Venezuela maintained its position on the documents final
negotiating schedule and on the accepted definition of democracy. Due to Venezuela's position,
for the first time in the history of the meetings, the final statement was not approved
unanimously among the heads of the thirty-four member countries. During the Quito Ministerial
Meetings of 2002, Chavez addressed the fact that the Venezuelan Constitution required a
national referendum before such an important national policy could be agreed to or implemented

3

The Helms Burton Act extends the U.S. embargo against Cuba to penalize non-American companies for trading
with Cuba.
4
Plan Colombia is an American initiative whose stated goal is to provide aid to the Colombian government in order
to stabilize its economy and eliminate its coca fields. The program is controversial as 80 percent of the program is
strictly military and government forces have been linked to right-wing paramilitary death squads. Additionally, the
herbicides that are used to kill the coca plants destroy the legitimate crops of poor farmers. (Cooper, 2001) The
program began in 2000 under the Clinton Administration and has given $4.5 billion in aid to Colombia making it the
top recipient of U.S. aid (Kem, 2006).
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in Venezuela (Lander, 2006). The FTAA was an important U.S. trade agreement and Chavez's
attempts to stall or subvert the process would have created conflict between the two nations.
Chavez has offered an alternative to the FT AA, called the Bolivarian Alternative for
America (ALBA), which would see the wealthier nations of North and South America, fund
development in the poorer states. The fact that South America could unite as an independent
trading bloc is a threat to the current version of the FTAA, which favours American interests. As
Venezuela pursues an independent course of development it serves as an example to other
nations that there are other models of governance and development, besides the U.S. based
neoliberal model. In his book Against Empire, Michael Parenti claims that "no country that
pursues an independent course of development shall be allowed to prevail as a dangerous
example to other nations" (Parenti, 1995). Therefore it is hardly surprising that Chavez has
earned the wrath of the U.S. government.
Under Chavez's leadership, Venezuela progressively loosened its ties with the American
dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Shortly after taking office,
Chavez paid Venezuela's debt to the IMF. In 2007, Venezuela repaid all debts to the World
Bank five years in advance of their due date, thereby saving $8 million dollars. As a symbolic
gesture, in 2008, Chavez officially withdrew his country from both financial institutions and
stated that it was the policies of the IMF and World Bank that were responsible for perpetuating
poverty in Latin America. Chavez has proposed a Bank of the South, supported by oil money, to
fund development projects in South America. 'Third world' or 'developing nations' which
would have access to Venezuelan loans would not be beholden to the structural adjustment
programs that are often conditions of borrowing from the World Bank and the IMF.
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The National Endowment for Democracy : Puppet Master of American Foreign Policy

The promotion of"democracy" has been a fundamental part of U.S. foreign policy for
most of the twentieth century. Since the 1980's, when the U.S. became the world's only
superpower, "democracy promotion" began to play a greater role in international relations. The
U.S. version of democracy promotion is synonymous with the expansion of economies and the
r

promotion of free market principles. Latin American development was based on the adage that
open economies "foster growth," allow "greater political freedoms" and create democracies that
are "reliable allies" (Youngers, 2000, p. 159). Generally, since the enactment of the Monroe
Doctrine, the U.S. has acted as a paternalistic empire exploiting resources and influencing the
internal affairs of Latin American countries. 5 Domestic institutions and government agencies
such as the U.S. Information Agency (USIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the state and justice departments, and government organizations like the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) were used to "strengthen" democratic institutions, principles
and processes abroad (Romero, 2002; Golinger, 2008).
One of the most damaging institutions to have played a major role in Latin American
affairs is the NED. The NED is an institution developed to provide political support to groups in
other countries which are sympathetic to U.S. interests. As an extension of the American
Congress, the NED is a key indicator of American foreign policy. Ron Paul, a U.S.
Congressperson, writing for Anitwar.com describes the NED as "a heavily subsidized foreign
policy loose cannon" (Paul, 2003, para 6). William Blum (2002) argues the NED was formed
because of the negative international attention that the CIA received while performing
5
U.S. involvement in South America began with establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823. The original purpose
of the policy was to lessen the influence of colonial Europe on South American countries. The result was that it
opened the door for the United States to play a major political role in the exploitation of South America.
Roosevelt's Corollary (1904) is an amendment to the Monroe Doctrine which justified the US as an international
police force (Greene, 2005).
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clandestine operations abroad. Allen Winstien, who assisted in drafting the initial NED
legislation, said "A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA" (cited in
Blum, 2000, p.179). As a quasi-private institution, the NED could continue to influence the
political landscape of foreign countries while avoiding the stigma attached to the CIA. In regard
to the situation in Venezuela, the NED, in cooperation with USAID, is proven to have played a
destructive role in the April 2002 coup against Hugo Chavez by funding opposition parties and
their affiliates (Golinger, 2005; Golinger, 2008).
After World War II, foreign governments, which were U.S. allies, experienced political
resistance within their own countries. These political uprisings were viewed as a threat to
democracy. The United States had no official organization to provide assistance to its allies.
Instead,
U.S. policy makers resorted to covert means, secretly sending advisers,
equipment, and funds to support newspapers and parties under siege in Europe.
When it was revealed in the late 1960's that some American PVO's

[Private

Voluntary Organizations] were receiving covert funding from the CIA to 'wage
the battle of ideas at international forums,' the Johnson Administration concluded
that such funding should cease, recommending the establishment of 'a publicprivate mechanism' to fund overseas activities openly (Lowe, 2003, para 3).'
The idea of providing democratic support to one's allies was first established in
Germany. After WWII, German politics and political organizations were in disarray. In order to
rebuild the political system, the German Federal Republic Party developed "stiftungens" or
organizations dedicated to rebuilding the democratic institutions destroyed by the Nazis. There
were four "stiftungens," each one aligned with a major political party and each receiving funds
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from the West German treasury. "In the 1960's they began assisting their ideological
counterparts abroad, and by the mid-70's were playing an important role in both of the
democratic transitions taking place on the Iberian Peninsula" (Lowe, 2003, para 6).
In 1977, George Agree, an American political consultant, suggested the creation of a
foundation, based on the German model. The purpose of the foundation would be "to promote
communication and understanding between the two major U.S. political parties and other parties
around the world" (Lowe, 2003, para 8). By 1980, the American Political Foundation had been
formed. Initially its role was to provide briefings, appointments, and assistance to visiting
members of foreign political parties, members of foreign parliaments and academics. In 1982, in
a speech at Britain's Westminster Palace, then President Ronald Reagan, discussed a study by
the American Political Foundation to "determine how the U.S. can best contribute--as a nation-to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force" (Lowe, 2003, para 9). This speech
was seen as a key foreign affairs event that would eventually lead to the development of the
National Endowment for Democracy. The American Political Foundation, with the assistance of
a $300,000 grant from the Agency for International Development, launched a study that would
become known as the "The Democracy Program."
The Democracy Program recommended the establishment of a bipartisan, private,
non-profit corporation to be known as the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED). The Endowment, though non-governmental, would be funded primarily
through annual appropriations and subject to congressional oversight. NED, in
tum, would act as a grant-making foundation, distributing funds to private
organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. These private
organizations would include those created by the two political parties and the
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busine~s community, which would join the regional international institutes of the
labour movement already in existence (Lowe, 2003, para 9).
The NED, although considered non-governmental, would receive funding from the
government and be accountable to congressional oversight. One of the proposed objectives of
the NED was to act as a "grant-making foundation," distributing funds to the private
organizations under its umbrella "for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad" (Lowe, 2003,
para 9).
The categorization of the NED as 'non-governmental' is interesting to note given that the
organization is funded and supervised through the Department of State and Congress (Go linger,
2008). Furthermore, the NED is accountable to Congress, the highest American political body.
This 'quasi-government' organization was funded exclusively by congressional funds until 1994.
Now the organization receives funding of approximately $30 million dollars per year, budgeted
through the USIA (United States Information Agency).
In 1983, under the Reagan administration, the National Endowment for Democracy was
officially formed and funded by an act of congressional legislation. Soon after its establishment,
four affiliate organizations were created as 'core grantees' all falling under the NED umbrella:
the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the American Centre
for International Labour Solidarity (ACILS) also known as Solidarity Centre. The affiliates
represent the interests of business and private enterprise, the Democratic Party, the Republican
Party and labour via the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial
Organizations). Lastly, there are "discretionary grants" which are distributed directly by the NED
to assist "pro-democracy" organizations abroad which are working in the areas oflaw, anti-
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corruption, independent media and conflict resolution (Conry, 1993). In 1994, two additional
organizations were developed under the NED umbrella, the International Forum for Democratic
Studies (IFDS) and the (DRC) Democracy Resource Centre (Raman, 2002).
The Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House Committee on International
Status of Democracy in Latin America, describes the NED's role in Latin America as focusing
on four key areas: access to justice and the rule of law; promoting greater accountability and
transparency of elected governments; broadening and improving political representation and
participation; and miscellaneous programs to address country specific concerns (Sabatini, 1999).
Despite its altruistic language, the effects of the NED's programs are insidious, subverting
progressive union movements, manipulating elections and helping to overthrow democratically
elected governments (Blum, 2000). Since its inception, the National Endowment for Democracy
has been active in South America. The NED has reflected American government interests of
fighting communism over people's rights to sovereignty and self-determination (Golinger, 2008).
One of the main concerns of the NED's opponents is its status as a "quasi-private
organization," dependent on the U.S. taxpayer for funding through the State Department. This
organization has the latitude to pursue "an independent foreign policy under the guise of
'promoting democracy' "and is exempt from "all political and administrative controls" which is
a contradiction to its responsibility to Congress (Conry, 1993, para 7). This "enables the U.S.
Government to deny any responsibility for NED's activities, and the NED can claim it is an
independent non-governmental organization (NGO), and thus not subject to governmental
scrutiny or oversight" (Scripes, 2004, para 13 ). The power to set foreign policy is a privilege
given to the federal government by the Constitution. In the case of Venezuela, we must critically
examine where the money that the government gives the NED is being spent. Is the NED
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promoting democracy, or meddling in the affairs of a sovereign nation, and attempting to
eliminate the democratically elected leader, Hugo Chavez?
Overwhelmingly, the documents obtained by the Venezuelan Solidarity Committee,
through the Freedom of Information Act, show an "intricate and meticulous pattern of financing
to the Venezuelan opposition that basically is penetrating all sectors of Venezuelan society"
("Hugo Chavez Accuses," 2004, para 12). Grants have been given to the agricultural sector,
education, the legal sector, police, military, and, most importantly, to strengthen political parties.
Chris Sabatini, spokesperson for NED, has attempted to portray the NED's role as supporting
and defending human rights. This claim seems less than accurate when compared against the
fact that only anti-Chavez groups have received money through the various arms of the NED. In
his paper titled "The NED targets Venezuela," Bill Berkowitz describes the NED as follows:
[The] NED functions as a full-service infrastructure-building clearinghouse. It
provides money, technical support, supplies, training programs, media know-how,
public relations assistance, and state-of-the art equipment to select political
groups, civic organizations, labour unions, dissident movements, student groups,
book publishers, newspapers, and other media. The organization's aim is to
destabilize progressive movements, particularly those with a socialist or
democratic-socialist bent (Berkowitz, 2004, para 8).
Documents obtained through the Access to Information Act show that the NED has given over
$1 million to projects related to anti-Chavez groups ("Hugo Chavez Accuses", 2004). The NED
quadrupled its budget in Venezuela prior to the April 2002 coup. "In addition to the $157,337 to
ACILS, NED provided $339,998 to the international wing of the Republican Party; $210,000 to
the international wing of the Democratic Party; and presumably another $171,125 to the Centre
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for International Private Enterprise, the international wing of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce"
(Scripes, 2005, p.).
One of the main ways that the NED operates to create political turmoil is by influencing
the role of organized labour. The ACILS (American Centre for Labour Solidarity or "Solidarity
Centre") receives money from the NED. NED provided ACILS $587,926 from 1997 to 2001
/'

and $157,377 in 2001 (Scipes, 2004). The amount of $587,926 represents one quarter of the
total budget that went to the ACILS for its work with the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers
(CTV). In 2002, the NED spent $1,099,352 in Venezuela of which the ACILS received
$116,001. In total ACILS received $703,927 between the years of 1997 to 2002 for its work in
Venezuela alone (Scipes, 2004 ).
ACILS is a branch of the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour-Congress of
Industrial Organizations). The CTV, with its notoriously corrupt leadership, is affiliated with the
AFL-CIO. The CTV opposes Chavez due to his attempts to force the organization to reform.
Carlos Ortega, CTV leader, worked closely with Pedro Carmona and was invited by an NED
affiliate to Washington to meet with Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemispheric
Affairs (Blum, 2004 ). Pedro Carmona, a member of the Venezuelan business elite group
FEDECAMARAS, was the man who assumed the presidency in the April 2000 coup. The
Washington meeting of these three men has been highly criticized due to their political interests
and the timing of the meeting prior to the coup.
When the coup attempt was not successful the American government and the NED tried
other means to remove Chavez from office. The initiative to begin the recall referendum against
Chavez was also heavily funded by the United States through the NED. In September of 2003,
the Venezuelan company Sumate received more than $50,000 from the NED (Berkowitz, 2004).
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Sumate injected itself into the recall referendum signature collection process offering logistical
and technical support. The Venezuelan constitution already provides for the National Elections
Council (CNE), a non-partisan government body, which is dedicated to election issues and
regulation. Furthermore, international observers from the Carter Centre and the OAS
(Organization of American States) ensured that the CNE was doing an "evenhanded job"
(Berkowitz, 2004, para 15). Therefore, Venezuela did not have a need for a company to provide
logistical or technical assistance. The second part of Sumate' s mandate was to train a network of
volunteers to promote popular support for the referendum (Blum, 2004). In fact, Sumate
volunteers worked as allies to the anti-Chavez campaign and its supporters.
Chris Sabatini, NED senior progrc1m officer for Latin America and the Caribbean, stated
that the NED planned to donate $922,000 in Venezuela, largely to groups opposing Chavez
(Jones, 2004).

In President Bush's 2004 State of the Union address, he pledged to double the

budget of the National Endowment for Democracy. When former Minnesota Republican
Congressperson Vin Weber took over as chair ofNED's board in July 2001, he made it clear that
the organization was interested in playing a more dominant role in shaping and supporting U.S.
foreign policy objectives. That is exactly what it appears to be doing in Venezuela. This
mandate by the United States ensures that there will be continued conflict between the two
countries, as Chavez has reacted strongly to U.S. interference. Chavez has threatened to cut off
oil shipments to the United States if the Bush administration persists in its efforts to undermine
him (Jones, 2004).
Although the NED and other bureaucrats have attempted to deny the fact that the NED
and its affiliates have tried to overthrow the Chavez government, their own reports suggest
otherwise. A report entitled, "A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela-November 2001-
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April 2002," suggested that the endowment, the Pentagon, and other U.S. assistance programs
"provided training, institution-building and support to individuals and organizations understood
to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chavez government" (Jones, 2004, para 21).
Critics say the NED activities in Venezuela parallel President Bush's desire to topple Chavez, an
accusation NED officials deny. Bush has proven to be a strong supporter of the NED, speaking
at the group's 20th anniversary celebration. In addition, the Senate and the House have passed
resolutions saluting the endowment's work (Jones, 2004).
Canadian Foreign Policy and Venezuela
According to Canadian government sources, the Canadian Consulate General was
established in Caracas, in 1948. Since that time Canada and Venezuela have had unbroken
diplomatic relations ("Canada-Venezuela Relations," 2008). In 1953, the Canadian Consulate
General was given embassy status and Henry G. Norman was named the first Canadian
Ambassador. The establishment of a permanent embassy served to cultivate trade and
investment ties with Venezuela. Canada imports more products from Venezuela than it exports,
specifically Venezuelan oil. A trade surplus exists in agriculture where Canada exports more
food goods and commodities (wheat, pulses, potatoes) to Venezuela than it imports
("Agriculture", 2006). In terms of aid, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
has provided assistance to Venezuela. This aid has been limited "in scope and [has] not included
any long term projects" ("Foreign Affairs," 2008). The Canadian Foreign Affairs website states
that "since 2002, when political tensions in Venezuela increased, Canada has supported
initiatives by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Carter Centre to promote a
peaceful and democratic resolution to problems in the country ("Foreign Affairs", 2008, para 4).
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On the s:irface Canada has had a mutually beneficial trade relationship with Venezuela
and foreign relations between the two nations could ostensibly be classified as diplomatic.
However, over the last decade Canada has allowed its international relations to be led by the
United States. Canada, via its Liberal and Conservative governments, has matched many of its
foreign policy initiatives and international relationships to those of the United States. This is
evident in the signing of the Free Trade Agreement and the meshing of military and security
policies. Although Canada has not played a leading role in the politics surrounding Latin
America, in other international conflicts Canada has acted as a junior partner to the American
empire.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The power of the U.S. propaganda system lies in its ability to mobilize an elite
consensus, to give the appearance of democratic consent, and to create enough
confusion, misunderstanding and apathy in the general population to allow elite
programs to go forward (Herman, 1996, p.2).
For most of the general public the mass media are primary sources of information
regarding current events, making them among the most powerful institutions in society (Ahmed,
2002). In a democratic society, it is imperative that the media act as conduits of information that
transfer social, political and cultural information to the electorate. A healthy and functioning
democracy with intrinsic checks and balances depends on a reasonably informed citizenship.
The media are supposed to act as "intermediary vehicles that reflect public opinion, respond to
public concerns and make the electorate cognizant of state policies, important events and
viewpoints" (Klaehn, 2005[a], p.l). In today's society the media are enmeshed in the established
capitalist system, causing them to legitimize dominant ideological principles and promote
economic systems that serve elite interests. Capitalist media tends to frame news discourse, limit
the allowable spectrum of debate on issues and influence public opinion in a way that does not
challenge the market system. By analyzing mainstream media we gain insight into the overall
structure of society, the power relations between the public and powerful elites, as well as the
ideologies produced by the media and their impact on society (Ahmed, 2002).
The Propaganda Model (PM)
The Propaganda Model (PM) was developed by Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002), as a
framework for analysing and understanding the structure of American mainstream media.
Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002) view the media as vehicles to amuse, entertain and inform,
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while inculcating the general public with values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that integrate
them into the structure of a larger capitalist society.
Initially, the PM was criticized as a 'conspiracy theory' because of its focus on the socialpolitical power that lies behind the media allowing it to function as a system. The model
suggests that free market forces affect the operation of the press in particular ways so that the
media serve elite class interests. Jeffery Klaehn (2005[b]) views the conspiracy theory critique
as merely a false label used to unfairly question the legitimacy of the model. Klaehn (2005 [b])
rebuts this argument by stating that conspiracy "implies controls that are divorced from normal
institutional channels," whereas, the PM looks at "patterns of media behaviour and attempts to
explain them in structural terms" (p.223).
At first glance, we may associate 'media propaganda' with a state controlled media
system. Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002) suggest that it is "difficult to see a propaganda
model at work where the media are private and formal censorship is absent" (p. 1). The PM
allows us to view the ways in which, even in a competitive market advocating free speech, the
news is constructed in a particular way so as to serve elite class interests. According to the PM,
news must pass through five filters before being consumed by its audience: (1) the size,
ownership and profit orientation of major news sources; (2) advertising; (3) the sources of mass
media news; (4) 'flak'; and (5) an anti-Communist filter. Together these filters represent the
"multi-level capability of powerful, business and government entities and collectives (e.g., the
Business Roundtable; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; industry lobbies and front groups) to exert
power over the flow of information" (Herman, 1996, p.1 ).
Ownership acts as a media filter because it forms the structural context in which news is
produced. Free market conditions, the constant drive for profits, and the enormous capital
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investment required to own a news agency has concentrated the media into the hands of wealthy
individuals, families, and corporations. The dominant elites, who control media production,
share common political, economic and social interests that are then reflected in the media
(Klaehn, 2005 [a]). They share common interests with "major corporations, banks, and
government" (Ahmed, 2002, p.4). Media conglomerates may have "interlocking" board
members, where one person sits on the board of more than one corporation. Being interlocked
with other large corporations allows the board of directors or executives to use their influence
and contacts to further their business agendas.
In the United States, media outlets have consolidated to form media conglomerates that
control almost every aspect of media development, production, and distribution. McChesney
and Waterman (2000) state that the media trends of the 21 st century are toward increased
corporate concentration, conglomeration, and hypercommercialism. These large media entities
are profit-oriented corporations which are often integrated into the stock market and subject to
pressures from stockholders, directors and bankers (Ahmed, 2002). This situation is particularly
concerning because some of the businesses that the conglomerates own, specifically the media,
are responsible for providing the general public with news, information and entertainment. In

The New Media Monopoly, author Ben Bagdikian (2004) states that the majority of American
media are currently controlled by five "global dimension firms" (p.12). The concentration of
ownership is significantly different from prior decades (i.e. the 1980's), when fifty companies
were identified as dominant media corporations. By 2003, Time Warner was the largest
conglomerate in the world, followed closely by The Walt Disney Company; Murdoch News
Corporation of Australia; Viacom; and Bertelsmann of Germany. The 'Big Five,' as they are
known, have holdings in all the various modes of media, from newspapers, magazines, book
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publishers, motion picture productions, to radio and television. Furthermore, concentrated
conglomerate control of media presents a possible conflict of interest when a news agency
reports on affairs in which the parent company has direct or indirect dealings.
Canada has one of the highest levels of ownership concentration for media outlets in the
industrialized world (Manifesto, 2008, para. 3). "Today, four conglomerates control 70 percent
of the country's daily papers, three corporations broadcast most of the televised news and two
companies own the majority ofradio stations" (Manifesto, 2008, para 4). In the case of
Canadian daily newspapers, concentration of ownership has increased over the last four years.
As of 2006, thirteen media companies owned all of the daily newspapers. Many of the largest
daily newspaper companies have increased the number of papers they own. For example,
Quebecor/Sun Media went from owning four papers in 1994 to seventeen in 2006. By
comparison, independently owned newspapers have declined from ten in 1994, to four in 2006
("A profile," 2007).
Our news is further homogenized when we consider that media conglomerates often
centralize news production and disseminate the same news to all of their media platforms
(Manifesto, 2007, para. 3). For example, the Globe and Mail is owned by the multimedia
company CTV Globemedia Inc. In addition to the national newspaper, CTV Globemedia also
operates 27 conventional television stations across the country, with interests in 35 specialty
channels; CHUM division radio, which operates 35 radio stations in different areas of the
country; and Dome Productions which is a high definition production facility (CTV globemedia,
2008).
Advertising revenue significantly impacts the budget of a newspaper and serves to offset
production costs. Without sufficient advertising a newspaper cannot be economically viable

31

under the free market system. Although newspapers are produced to be sold to subscribers,
circulation revenue accounts for far less of the total revenue of a newspaper than advertising.
For this reason, newspapers that rely on subscription fees alone are at a severe disadvantage and
are often forced out of business. Due to the exorbitant amount of money derived from
advertising dollars one could argue that it is the advertisers that decide which media outlets are
viable and which ones are doomed to fail. Under this system, consumer demand has almost no
influence over the success of a newspaper. Instead, media prosperity and survival are
determined by the advertising decisions of big business (Herman & Chomsky, 1988/2002).
Media outlets require a continuous volume of information, which they can process into
news stories. The cost of investigating information and gathering facts about pertinent current
events causes the media to concentrate their efforts where significant news occurs, and where
regular press conferences are held (Herman & Chomsky, 1988/2002). Therefore, media outlets
are often forced to rely on information from governments, corporations, trade groups, or
universities. These sources are seen as credible, standardized, and reliable producers of
information due to their status and prestige. According to the PM, the media's mandate to use
'official sources' or the power that government and corporate sources have is a filter that the
news must pass through.
Additionally, corporate sources have sophisticated and well-funded public relations
departments producing pre-packaged information and lobbying materials. Herman and Chomsky
(1988/2002) suggest that large bureaucracies of the powerful "subsidize the mass media," and
gain special access because their contributions reduce the media's costs of acquiring the "raw
materials of information" (p.22). Through their co-dependent relationship with the media,
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bureaucrats and corporate executives have the power to 'manage the news' by flooding the
media with stories promoting a particular bias.
Occasionally, media statements or programs may offend individuals or groups of people.
When individuals or groups protest the media in some way, such as by writing letters, petitions,
logging complaints or staging boycotts they are producing 'flak' for the media. Advertisers do
not want to be associated with controversial, 'flak' producing issues. The PM argues that
because of the mass media's dependence on revenue from advertising, they are forced to selfmonitor messages, programs, or stories that may produce 'flak.' Consumers are not the only
ones who produce 'flak' in response to offensive programs or stories. The rich and powerful can
produce 'flak' directly, through the use of connections and political pressure, or indirectly by
funding right-wing think tanks. Right-wing think tanks push the agenda that the media are too
'liberal' and do not fairly represent the interests of business. Right-wing 'flak' impacts the
media that are conditioned to "expect trouble (and cost increase) for violating right-wing
standards of bias" (Herman & Chomsky, 1988/2002, p.28).
Over the last twenty years, world politics have shifted, and there is little threat of former
Communist powers or, more generally, of state Communist ideology, dominating the world
order. Although Communism is no longer a threat to American hegemony, the media's need to
'protect' us from viewing alternative economic models as viable is alive and well. Herman and
Chomsky's reference to an "anti-Communist filter" has now come to be known by other names,
such as the "evil-empire filter" or the "anti-ideology filter." This filter is synonymous with
supporting capitalist ideology while demonizing anyone or anything perceived as a threat to the
free market system. By instilling fear of a perceived enemy, elites can terrify the general
population into supporting continuous arms production and aggressive military mandates
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(Cromwell, 2002). The concept of a perceived enemy is intentionally unclear so it can be used to
discipline or control anyone who is against a free market ideology (Klaehn, 2002). This
narrowing of debate creates a situation where the spectrum of political discussion presented in
the news is limited to conservative ideas. Dissenting voices, or voices purposing alternatives, are
discredited or silenced.
Not only are enemies of the market attacked, there is an almost religious belief in the free
market itself. The anti-Communist filter can be expanded to include a belief in the free market
as a 'benevolent' and 'self-sustaining' economic model. Any economic incidents that may
expose the failings of the free market system are manipulated to reinforce the 'the miracle of the
market' (Herman, 2003). For example, the stagnation of the 1980s Soviet Union market was
assigned to the absence of markets, while the collapse of capitalist Russia, in the 1990s, was
blamed on the politicians and workers who did not allow the market to 'work it's magic'
(Herman, 2003).

The anti-communist filter serves to automatically dismiss progressive

alternatives by labelling them 'Communist' thereby reinforcing the neoliberal model.
Amplifying the power of this filter is the fact that the market economy is presented as if there is
no alternative (TINA). Previous failed 'state capitalist' models, that have been referred to as
'communist,' are used as evidence that alternatives to capitalism are futile. Furthermore, nonfree market economic initiatives or models are presented as unrealistic or utopian.
The fact that market economic policies are developed to serve the capitalist system is
rarely discussed in the media. In the article "Extending and Refining the Propaganda Model, "
Sparks (2007) argues that although capitalists, as a class, may compete on an individual level
they have a common agenda. Capitalists are concerned with maintaining their rights to "dispose
of the means of production as private property and to ensure that they are able to expropriate the
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surpluses generated in production" (Sparks, 2007 p. 72). Further to their economic interests,
historically, the capitalist class has had common political interests and has been closely
intertwined with the nation state (Sparks, 2007). The situation in Venezuela is heavily
influenced by how the American nation state has tried to influence the outcome of the Bolivarian
Revolution. According to Sparks (2007), "it is the collusion between the interests of capital and
the policy of the state that is the substance of modem imperialism" (p.73). The PM is useful
when examining the media coverage of Venezuela because it acknowledges that the elite western
media maintain a propaganda function by "adhering to an imperialist ideology and by
legitimizing U.S. interventionist forays" (Klaehn, 2002[a], p.167). By doing so the media
indirectly protect capitalist corporations while they exploit the natural resources of the
developing world (Klaehn, 2002[a]).
As a result of the five filters which potential news stories must pass through, citizens
receive a sanitized version of the news. In the mass commercial media we are likely to see news
that reflects the interests of media owners, does not offend advertisers, and that relies on
'credible' bureaucratic sources. The general public can expect news to promote the interests of
dominant elite groups and oppose or vilify any 'anti-capitalist' views or challenges to the status
quo. Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002) suggest that the filters are a natural consequence of free
market forces allowed to operate without significant government control. In general, capitalist
ideology and the profit motive determine what becomes news, and how it is reported, interpreted
and produced.
While I have briefly outlined the five filters of the PM here, for the purposes of this thesis
I will focus mainly on the fifth filter. My rationale for doing so reflects Herman and Chomsky's
acknowledgement that the anti-communist filter- as originally conceptualized- may not be as
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relevant in today's post-Communist world. As previously noted, there have been considerable
shifts in the global political landscape since the PM was first conceived. However, while blatant
anti-Communism may no longer be employed directly, echoes of it are clearly discernible in the
media coverage of countries, such as Venezuela, which have challenged the free market
orthodoxy of neoliberal ideology and the "Washington consensus." Therefore, in subsequent
chapters, I will foreground the anti-Communist filter since the North American mainstream
media's privileging of capitalism over socialism arguably informs the criticisms of the Chavez
government. This filter best illustrates the ways in which the news is produced and shaped in
order to present a particular image of Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Project.

Criticisms of the Propaganda Model
Although the PM is generally accepted as one of the most thoroughly researched and
empirically verified models of media analysis, there have been some scholarly criticisms of the
work. One common charge against the model suggests that the authors have failed to solicit the
input of reporters regarding their actual working conditions and the editorial pressures they face
(Herman, 1996). Furthermore, critics suggest the PM discounts journalists' abilities to remain
professional and objective. These critics fail to realize that the 'professionalism' movement in
the press was not an autonomous movement of the workers against the media owners. It was
encouraged by owners and therefore has served to allow journalists to internalize some of the
owner's commercial values particularly around attaining credible, official and inexpensive
sources (Herman, 2003). Critics like Hallin and LaFeber (cited in Herman, 1996) discuss Ronald
Reagan's interventionist policies in South America as examples of media reporting that ran
counter to U.S. foreign policy. This example is used to imply that the PM is not conscious of
situations where the media have opposed or resisted elite policy. Herman and Chomsky
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(1988/2002) clearly state that there are conditions that will lead to varied media coverage of
events when elites are divided or have limited interest in an issue. In this case, a 'range of
debate' may ensue, although the debate will likely be a disagreement of methods versus overall
interests. In the case of Reagan's South American agenda, the debate focused on which tactics to
use not whether the U.S. had the fundamental right to pursue an interventionist policy (Herman,
2003). In many respects, this is similar to contemporary media coverage of the "war on terror" while tactics and military strategy are often debated within the "bounds" of the permissible,
American foreign policy and its imperial ambitions are rarely, if ever, accorded critical attention.
The other major criticism of the model is that it views media behaviour from an overly
deterministic stance and tends to be plagued by sociological reductionism (Klaehn, 2002). In
addition, critics claim the model is mechanical and functionalist (Herman, 2003 ). Suggesting
that the model is determinist ignores the fact that all models have determinist elements. One
must prove that a model is "not logically consistent, operates on false premises, or that the
predictive power of the determining variables is poor" for that assumption to be valid (Herman,
1996/2003). One of the strengths of the PM is that it uses "mechanisms and policies," which lie
behind the system, to illustrate how "the powerful protect their interests naturally and without
overt conspiracy" (Herman, 2003, p. 7). The model is able to expose a "dynamic and self
protecting system in operation" (Herman, 2003, p. 7). Despite such critiques, the PM is generally
accepted by communications scholars as an important framework for analyzing media structures
and news outputs. In addition, the model is recommended as an essential resource for media
literacy by groups such as Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), the Grand Rapids
Institute for Information Democracy (GRIID), and the Oxford-based Corporate Watch (Ahmed,
2002).
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Critical Discourse Analysis
In addition to using the PM as a conceptual framework, Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) will be used as a methodology to analyse the articles of the New York Times and the

Globe and Mail. In the past, news has been viewed for its political, social, or psychological
aspects while the fact that the news itself is a particular discourse has been ignored (Van Dijk,
1988). Media discourse and news reports are now acknowledged in their own right as "particular
types of language use or text and as specific kinds of sociocultural practice" (Van Dijk, 1988,
p.2).
CDA uses a multidisciplinary approach to research relevant social problems and political
issues affecting people's lives. It aims to do more than antiseptically describe discourse
structures and instead aims to explain discourse in relation to larger social and political contexts.
CDA attempts to show the interrelationship between the text, the discursive practices that create
and interpret the text, and the larger social context (Huckin, 2005). This approach differs from
other forms of textual analysis because it tends to take an 'ethical stance' against "power
imbalances, social inequities, non-democratic practices and other injustices" (Huckin, 2005, p.
2). CDA specializes in deconstructing the meaning of texts (written or oral) that are "deemed to
be politically or culturally influential to a given society" (Huckin, 2005, p.2). Texts are viewed
as being products of "discursive practices, including production, distribution and interpretation,"
which are immersed in "social practices" (Huckin, 2005, p.2). CDA attempts to expose how
socially constructed views of reality are created to favour dominant forces in society.
Huckin (2005) has outlined a very effective and pragmatic method of approaching written
text which I use when examining the newspaper coverage of the 2002 coup against Hugo

38

Chavez. Huckin's strategy suggests reading any given text from two perspectives - first more
broadly as a 'typical reader,' then with more depth as a 'critical reader.'
Huckin identifies five categories which can be used to analyze the production of media
texts. A text is read for its perspective, angle or slant, which is referred to as framing.
Foregrounding /backgrounding occurs when an article gives prominence to certain concepts
and/or de-emphasizes other concepts. This can be as a result of style or due to structural
expectations of certain genres. One of the most egregious forms of backgrounding is omission.
Omission is particularly important because readers do not have the opportunity to challenge
something that is not presented as part of the discussion. Readers can also be manipulated
through the writer's use of presuppostitions. Presupposition, refers to the use of language that
takes certain ideas for granted while giving the impression that there is no alternative.
Discursive differences, or the writer's change of style, can be used to emphasize the authority or
expertise of one position within a text.
Once the researcher has assessed the text as a whole, Huckin suggests reading the text on
a 'sentence to sentence' level. For this level of analysis, a variety of elements are highlighted.
Topicalization is a sentence level version of foregrounding where the sentence topic position is
used to reinforce importance in the text. Choosing which subject is put in the topic position of a
sentence is a choice made by the writer and provides insight into the article's perspective or
slant. It is also important to notice which subjects are put in the agent position (active exerting
power) and which subjects are described from a patient (passive recipient) perspective. At the
sentence level, agentless passive construction occurs in order to delete or omit the agent all
together. For example, a headline reading "Massacre of 25 Villagers" does not give any insight
into who may be guilty of the crime (Huckins, 2005). A critical reader would discover various
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forms of assumptions in the body of a text, mainly in the form of presuppositions or insinuations.
Both of these elements are difficult to challenge, as they are easily and subtly manipulated
aspects of the text. Presuppositions occur when a statement is made which leads the reader to
assume the statement is actually a taken-for-granted fact. Insinuations are suggestive comments
with a double meaning and if questioned, the writer can claim the less inflammatory meaning.
Finally, Huckin (2005) suggests viewing the text from the level of words and phrases
while looking for connotations, labels metaphors, register and modality. Connotations give
certain words or phrases special meanings derived from their common use in a social context.
Connotations can take the form of labels or can be conveyed using metaphors or figures of
speech. The level of formality or informality and its degree of technicality are considered the
register of the text. Discourse can also be read for its modality, or the tone of statements with
regard to their degree of certitude and authority. Phrases "like, may, might, could, will, must, it
seems to be, without a doubt, and it's possible" denote modality (Huckin, 2005, p. 8).
Article Selection
To search for potential newspaper articles I used the Proquest Historical Newspapers
database, the New York Times and the Canadian Newsstand database. To obtain articles, I
searched each database using the keywords 'Chavez' and 'Venezuela'. Initially, the search
parameters were set for the time frame of 1998, when Chavez was first elected, until 2004. As
this was an unmanageable sample and resulted in many irrelevant articles, I changed the time
frame of my search. A time frame spanning from December 2001 to December 2002 allowed for
the inclusion of articles leading up to the April 2002 coup attempt, and encompassed all relevant
articles after the coup.
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The sample that I worked with included eighteen articles from the Globe and Mail and
sixty articles from the New York Times. Given my intent to focus mainly on the fifth filter of the
propaganda model - anti-communism and its more contemporary configurations - I conducted a
preliminary examination of the articles to look for discernible patterns in the way in which the
events related to the 2002 coup were covered. That analysis revealed that certain themes such as
pro-neoliberalism, "democracy" -or more specifically, the conflation of democracy with free
market ideology, and characterizing political figures who challenged neoliberal orthodoxy (in
this case, Hugo Chavez) as anti-democratic and even sympathetic to terrorism shaped and
informed the coverage of the 2002 coup in Venezuela.
Like many critical qualitative approaches, CDA emphasizes the importance of selfreflexivity and thus demands that the researcher identify any personal involvement with the issue
under investigation. Therefore, it must be noted that in 2006, I had the opportunity to travel to
Venezuela and view, first hand, some of the government initiatives and their social impacts.
While in Caracas, I toured day care centres, workers' cooperatives, medical clinics and
subsidized markets. One of the most impressive of the government initiatives was the 'Barrio
Adentro' program which established small medical clinics in poor neighbourhoods where people
previously had no access to medical treatment. Many poor neighbourhoods lacked running
water, sanitary systems and roadways. In the midst of these impoverished conditions are small
modem buildings which have all of the equipment to provide basic medical treatment. The
medical clinics are staffed by Cuban doctors through a trade arrangement that exchanges doctors
for oil.
Having had the opportunity to speak to some working class Venezuelan people, I was
overwhelmed by their passion and commitment to Hugo Chavez. The topic of my thesis has
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been inspired by the recent political situation in Venezuela and by the Venezuelan people who
have been willing to struggle for a different type of society. The vision of President Chavez and
the Venezuelan people has been challenged many times, predominantly by American interests
who still view the countries of South America in a paternalistic way, as ripe for exploitation.
Despite these challenges the people of Venezuela have led the way to a collective pursuit toward
socialism.
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CHAPTER3
ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE
We may agree that the point, as always, is not to interpret the world but to change
it; the problem, however, is that to interpret it convincingly is to change it.
(Attridge, 2004, p.121)
The Propaganda model (PM) argues that the corporate media legitimize the dominant
ideology "by systematically defending the principal economic, social and political agendas of
dominant elites and social institutions" (Klaehn, 2005[a], p. 7). Herman and Chomsky predict
that the propaganda function of the media will be apparent when analyzing the media's selection
of stories, quantity and quality of coverage, and manner in which some stories are handled over
others (Klaehn, 2005[a]). In regard to the political situation in Venezuela, elite interests favour
the removal of Hugo Chavez. In an era of accelerated globalization, Chavez has rejected the
violence of the American empire and has abandoned the neoliberal model in favour of an
economic system that prioritizes social welfare (Gindin, 2004). Based on the predictions of the
PM, particularly the 'anti-communist' filter, we expect to find newspaper coverage that justifies
the interests of an elite driven neoliberal agenda while discrediting alternative economic models.
The current world order is dominated by American imperialist views which advocate for
neoliberal globalization. The expanded definition of the fifth filter alerts readers to media
coverage favouring a free market system, American economic interests and American foreign
policy. The following discussion of the media coverage of the April 2002 coup against Hugo
Chavez is based on the theoretical foundations of the PM, specifically the anti-communist filter
as it is now understood. Critical Discourse Analysis is employed to examine the media coverage
of the coup in the Globe and Mail (GM) and The New York Times (NYT).
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Tensions Build Prior To the Coup
The articles published by the NYT in the days leading up to April 11, 2002 seemed to
warn of an impending coup. The news coverage of the coup focused on the perspectives of right
wing groups opposed to Chavez. Generally, the coverage systematically foregrounded the
concerns of the groups who were directly responsible for inciting the coup: the Confederaci6n de
Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), a right wing labour union, high ranking military officers and
the oil company bosses. Articles published in the NYT, from March 261h to April 11 th, centred
around a perceived military dissatisfaction with Chavez's leadership and a 'labour dispute' at the
state owned oil company, Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). Surprisingly, in the
tumultuous days leading up to the coup there was no coverage of the events taking place in
Venezuela by the GM. The only pre-coup article that may have alerted readers of a political
conflict in Venezuela was published a full month before tensions reached their peak. On
February 15, 2002, Paul Knox discussed Chavez's presidency and briefly made mention of the
strained political situation that existed in the country (Knox, 2002[c ], p.Al 9).
Pre-coup Discussion of the Military
At the time of the coup, some right wing military officers took political positions against
President Chavez and in line with the Venezuelan elite. One of the first order predictions of the
PM is that the media will "suppress and distort, advocate and promote in the interest of
establishing an ideologically serviceable consensus that will legitimize and facilitate corporate
and state moneyed interests" (Klaehn, 2005[a], p.11). The NYTarticle of March 26, one of the
longest and most in-depth pre-coup articles, is framed to give credibility to the complaints of a
small group of military officers opposed to Chavez. The reporter foregrounded the high-ranking
military officers desire to have Chavez removed as President. Quotes from military Admiral
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Molina call on all Venezuelans to "unite to demand the immediate resignation of President
Chavez" (Forero, 2002[j], p.A3). The article goes on to discuss how, "officers close to the
military say the discontent in the armed forces has risen sharply as more Venezuelans have
turned on its once-popular leader" (Forero, 2002[j], p.A3). The article's only counter to the
charges are two short statements from the government, one from president Chavez saying, "there
are no serious threats from the military ranks to the nation" and another from armed forces top
Commander Lucas Rincon declaring "there are people who are inciting rebellion, calling for a
coup d'etat, promoting confrontation, they are playing with fear and panic, it is very dangerous"
(Forero, 2002[j], p.A3). There are clear discursive differences in the way that the two
contradicting positions are presented in the coverage. Most notable is the fact that the reporter
wrote the article from the perspective of the military and not the incumbent government thereby
placing the military in the active agent position-initiating actions and exerting power. The
government's perspective was backgrounded by the lack of coverage in contrast to the military's
position, the defensive frame, and placement near the end of the article.
Omitted from the article were the exact reasons certain high-ranking members of the
military were opposed to Chavez. Instead, the author gave a general sense that the officers had
simply turned on the left-leaning Venezuelan president (Fonero, 2002Li]). Nowhere in the article
did it state specifically which left-leaning policies the officers were opposed to or what they
perceived might be their disastrous impacts. The passing of the Bolivarian constitution changed
the role of the military, expanding its function from a security force to a social agency. The
change allows the military to be called on to fulfill various aspects of social policy ranging from
building houses to delivering food. Although the fact that the military' s role has change is
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mentioned briefly, there is no discussion regarding the policy's positive social impacts or the
military' s potential distress about their new role.

It is interesting to note that the reporter from the NYT chose statements from Mr Carratu,
a former director of the Institute for National Defence Studies (INDS), a foreign organization, to
support his article. Carratu claims to have been in contact with many active officers who "are of
the belief that if society does not organize to take steps, they [the military] are going to have to
take control" (Forero, 2002[j], p.A3). He further stated that the military did not want "blood
shed to oust Chavez;" nor [did] they want to "gain a place in history with a coup." Instead, "if
they want to pass into history, then what they want to do is support civil society in its protests"
(Forero, 2002[j], p.A3). Framing the discussion in this way gives the impression that it was the
entire military body which had turned on the President. In reality there were only four military
officers who made strategic statements intentionally attempting to incite a coup. The fact that it
was the military which intended to take control if Chavez was overthrown was not challenged by
the reporter. Furthermore, there was no discussion of what the proper democratic, constitutional
channels would be if the government were to collapse - something which is outlined in the
constitution.
Although the article states that the military was not calling for a coup, it is very clear that
they were attempting to incite a coup. The reporter presupposes that the military had the right to
challenge the government and call for a coup. Rick Rozo ff of the website the Emperor's New

Clothes best sums up how slanted this news coverage was by saying "To put things in
perspective, imagine a U.S. Colonel demanding a popularly elected president step down. The
press would be full of warnings about threats to democracy, the rule of law, national security and
stability" (cited in Gowans, 2002, para 34 ). " Instead, Chavez was criticized for previously
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forcing disloyal military officers into retirement. One can only imagine what would happen to
high-ranking officers who attempted to incite a coup against a Western government.
Pre-coup factors: Oil Policy or Oil Executives
The expanded 'anti-communist' filter of the PM predicts that media coverage of an
event will promote corporate interests while presenting alternatives to the free market model as
unattainable or utopian. In discussions of government policy specifically, Herman and Chomsky
maintain reporting will typically be framed to "legitimize and facilitate elite (geo )politicaleconomic interests and prevent opposition to corporate hegemony" (Klaehn, 2005[a], p.11). In
fact, news coverage of the 'oil strike' at PDVSA followed this pattern closely. The state oil
company, PDVSA, has always been at the centre of the ideological struggle between
privatization and public ownership. The Venezuelan elite advocated for the formal privatization
of PDVSA while the vast majority of citizens believed PDVSA should be held as a state
resource. The new constitution, written under the Chavez government, declares that "for reasons
of economic and political sovereignty and of national strategy, the state will maintain the totality
of the shares of PDVSA or of the entity created to manage the oil industry" (Wilpert, 2007,
p.94). The intention of this clause in the constitution was to make a definitive break from the
neoliberal economic policies that previous governments had pursued in regard to PDVSA
(Wilpert, 2007). With the passing of the new constitution PDVSA was reaffirmed as a national
entity and a property of the government.
The media coverage of the labour dispute at PDVSA, presupposes that workers and the
managers were united against Chavez's policies. A NYT article published just prior to the coup,
states that employees at PDVSA had "orchestrated a successful work slowdown to protest moves
by President Hugo Chavez to exert greater control over the company and to divert more of its
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profit to the national treasury" (Banerjee, 2002[c], p.Al). At issue was the fact that Chavez
replaced board members at PDVSA with people faithful to him, people who shared the ideology
of the Bolivarian process. In general, the coverage foregrounded the concerns of executives,
backgrounded the desires of the Venezuelan people and omitted changes to the constitution that
justified Chavez's actions. Any discussion regarding the executives' attempts to privatize the
national oil company were completely absent from the coverage. Generally, the media coverage
of PDVSA was framed to promote privatization as natural and logical, while Chavez's policies
were made to seem extreme or radical.
The NYT quotes Chavez's criticism of PDVSA as being run as a 'state within a state,' yet
the reporter did not provide any context for this statement (Forero, 2002[i]). Previously,
PDVSA was being operated as its own entity with oil executives benefiting from what should
have been the nation's wealth. PDVSA was rife with corruption, wastefulness, misappropriated
funds, cronyism and nepotism. Executives were living luxurious lifestyles while there was little
accountability for profits. Managers were known to have awarded themselves enormous salaries
and to have diverted funds to private companies they controlled outside the country (McQuaig,
2004). In her book, It's The Crude Dude, Linda McQuaig (2004) describes PDVSA as a "world
of its own, a privileged, self-perpetuating dynasty in the midst of a land of poverty, feeding off
the country's fabulous oil wealth (p.111 ). "
Prior to Chavez assuming the presidency, PDVSA executives found a loophole in the ban
on foreign investment and placed 'marginal' oil fields out for international bid (Margonelli,
2007). Company executives had planned to privatize PDVSA and were holding discussions
about how to permanently remove the influence of the state (Margonelli, 2007). PDVSA' s
profits were being rerouted to avoid the state treasury by selling discounted oil to its subsidiaries
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abroad. "By the late 1990's PDVSA was transferring as much as $500 million per year from
Venezuela to its foreign subsidiaries" and these subsidiaries did not pay dividends back to the
parent company (Wilpert, 2007, p. 91 ). In addition to this income diversion scheme, PDVSA
lobbied the government for a reduction in its already low tax obligations, arguing that tax
payments were undermining the company's ability to invest in technological advances (Parker,
/

2006). Knowledge of the corrupt, bureaucratic practises of PDVSA provide some context to
Chavez's statement claiming PDVSA was operating outside of the government as a 'state within
a state'.
President Chavez could not change the direction of the oil company without changing
some of the people who where in key positions and had been part of the privatization attempt.
Chavez's new oil policies were made through the democratic process of the new constitution and
ratified by the Venezuelan people in a popular referendum. In W estem countries, by
comparison, it is an accepted fact that the state law impacts business practices. If the laws of the
land change, it is the responsibility of the board of directors and company executives to run the
business within the framework of the new laws. If a major corporation underwent a change of
fundamental policy and company executives did not want to adopt the new philosophy, they
would face the possibility of being fired. North American media would likely report that
company executives were terminated for failure to follow the company's new policies.
Clearly, corporate hegemony and a belief in the 'miracle of the market' informed the
media coverage of PDVSA. There was no criticism of the corruption and waste that occurred
when the company was being run as a market driven business. Instead, Chavez's policies were
presented as the reason for the instability in the oil market and the frustration of the company
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executives. In implementing the reforms laid out in the constitution and re-nationalizing
PDVSA, Chavez was called a dictator, described as autocratic and uncompromising.

The Oil 'Strike"
The articles preceding the coup were framed to give the sense that business and labour
leaders were opposed to Chavez's policies in the oil industry and that their opposition was
representative of the population as a whole. Former American trade minister, Moises Nairn, now
working in the United States for Foreign Policy Magazine, is quoted in the NYT as saying that
the labour dispute has ''brought together large swaths of society, and they see it as an opportunity
to get rid of Chavez" (Banjeree, 2002[c], p.Al). In fact, not all labour leaders were opposed to
Chavez and many were in support of changes that redistributed the country's oil wealth. The
'work slowdown' and 'strike' by the business leaders and middle management were discussed in
the lead up to the coup as if they were democratic protests and not economic sabotage or a
violation of state law.
During the oil strike, Carlos Ortega from the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers
(CTV) and Pedro Carmona head ofFedecamaras - the Chamber of Commerce, are quoted as
calling for an extension to the strike. In the weeks that followed, both of these men were
implicated as key figures in the April 14th coup attempt. Missing from the article is any question
as to why a supposedly independent trade union would be supporting the actions of the business
association and particularly, why a trade union would be opposed to money from the nation's
main government owned corporation, PDVSA, going into the national treasury for social
programs. The situation presented is so far removed from labour's traditional principles that it
would be as odd as a trade union striking to increase CEO salaries. Secondly, there was no
mention that the union involved, the CTV, is a historically bureaucratic and corrupt union that
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did not hold free secret ballot elections until the Chavez government made it the law for unions
to do so (Gindin, 2004). In addition, the CTV has been repeatedly criticized for 'working with
the bosses' and for being a part of the Venezuelan oligarchy (Fuentes, 2005). Gregory Wilpert
(2002) asks some key questions in regard to the oil strike:
Are the Chamber of Commerce, the labour federation leadership, the upper class,
and significant sectors of the middle class really primarily concerned about the
'politicization' of PDVSA and the appointment of pro-government board of
directors? (p. 4). Does opposition to these appointments justify a general strike?
Definitely not (Wilpert, 2002, p.4).
These are excellent questions to consider and the reader is left wondering why these same
questions were not asked in the mainstream media.
Articles published in the NYT generally gave the sense that protests by the oil workers
had the support of the broader labour community and that the work stoppage was gaining support
among the general public. An April 11 th NYT article by Juan Forero, filled with anti-Chavez
commentary, contained one small paragraph at the end of the article which concluded with
"officials said most Venezuelans continued to support Mr. Chavez, adding that few people took
part in the work stoppage, which began to wane in its second day" (Forero, 2002[f], p.A6). In
fact, the strike was initiated by Fedecamaras, of which the majority of large businesses were
members. Businesses associated with Fedecamaras would have participated in the 'strike' by
closing their doors and effectively locking out their employees. Although the media portrayed
the strike as having had widespread support, it is difficult to tell if workers actually believed in
the strike and stayed away from work to protest the government or whether they were absent due
to businesses being closed by management (Wilpert, 2002). When one takes into account the
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public and informal sectors, it seems a large percentage of workers did not participate in the
general strike. Workers in the informal sector continued to sell their wares on the street and
many other businesses remained open (Wilpert, 2002). All government offices and banks were
open for business accounting for approximately 40 percent of Venezuela's workforce.
Summary of Pre-Coup Articles
/

In contrast to the six articles published in the NYT, the Globe and Mail (GM) did not
allocate any coverage to the pressures mounting in the days leading up to the Venezuelan coup.
There was little significant coverage until President Chavez was removed from power and the
coup had begun. In total, pre-coup coverage consisted of a short article by Paul Knox, published
on February 15, describing Hugo Chavez's presidency and a sixty word brief, on April 11. Paul
Knox' s article, printed approximately one month before the coup, labels Chavez a "blowhard"
who has "railed against dastardly elites-the rich, the media, the Roman Catholic Church"
(Knox, 2002[c], p.A19). The main focus of the article was the decrease in oil prices occurring in
the world market. The argument the author presented was that the success of the Chavez
government was dependent on oil prices. Knox suggests, "As long as oil prices were high and he
[Chavez] was able to spread some of the profits around, his popularity remained strong." Knox
took an inflammatory position when he stated that "demagoguery and political marketing only
get you so far. After you win there's still a country to run- in this case a troubled nation of 24
million people" (Knox, 2002[c], p.A19). The insinuation was that Chavez's policies were not
based on any viable economic alternative and that without the oil wealth Chavez could not lead
the country. Knox leads the reader to believe Chavez's popularity was based on charity and not
on sound political policy or his ability to improve the material conditions of the Venezuelan
people. The article implies that Chavez was not capable of instituting real change and goes as far
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as to say that he was damaging public institutions. In reality, Chavez had, at that point in his
presidency, already established social programs that positively impacted the lives of many
Venezuelans, as previously discussed.
One can only surmise the reasons for the GM s newsroom decision not to follow the
events that occurred in the days that led up to the coup. One possibility is that, unlike the United
States, there was a lack of conflict between the Venezuelan and Canadian governments therefore
having made the situation less newsworthy to Canadian readers. As Venezuela is not one of
Canada's main trading partners, events occurring in that nation do not have as large an impact as
they would in the United States. The papers editors could have seen the unrest that was brewing
in Venezuela as just another Latin American incident that would not have lasting effects.
Another factor which may have resulted in more American coverage may have been that
journalists from the NYT would have had greater access to American government officials who
would have been keenly aware of events taking place in Venezuela.

The April 2002 Coup d'etat
The NYT articles, printed the day after the coup, were framed to imply the coup evolved
naturally from dissatisfaction with Chavez's decision to replace managers at PDVSA.
According to news accounts, this dissatisfaction quickly turned into a general strike where
Chavez supporters became violent. Due to the violence, the military took control of the country
and handed the presidency to a respected business leader. One of the initial articles covering the
coup, claims that,
"this week's cns1s began with a general strike against replacing
professional managers at the state oil company with political cronies. It took a
grave tum Thursday when armed Chavez supporters fired on peaceful strikers,
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killing at least 12 and injuring hundreds.

Mr. Chavez's response was

characteristic. He forced five private television stations off the air for showing
pictures of the massacre. Early yesterday he was compelled to resign by military
commanders unwilling to order their troops to fire on fellow Venezuelans to keep
him in power.

He is being held at a military base and may face charges in
/

Thursday's killings" ("Hugo Chavez Departs," 2002, p.AI6).
In contrast, the GM carried a story that discussed the price of oil falling due to tensions in
Venezuela. The article contained one line referring to Chavez calling for "talks to end the
general strike" (Brethour, 2002, p.B3). The GM did not carry in depth coverage regarding the
coup until April 13th, one full day later.
The expanded definition of the anti-communist filter includes the methods that the
media employ to naturalize the ideology of the capitalist system. When looking at the hard news
coverage of the coup itself, certain themes seemed to emerge. I will focus my discussion around
three specific themes: economic policy, "democracy", and President Chavez himself. Two
important aspects of the capitalist system are the way in which the state manages the economy
and the perception of democracy amongst the people. The discussion of Hugo Chavez as
president is filtered through the PM's original definition of anti-communism. Initially, the anticommunist filter served to elevate opposition to anything that could be perceived as
'communist'. Communism as an oppositional ideology is intentionally left unclear so that it can
be used against anyone "advocating policies that threaten property interests or support
accommodation with Communist states and radicalism" (Herman and Chomsky, 1988/2002,
p.29).
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Economic Reasoning
The government of every nation has the right and the responsibility to ensure the stability
of its economy. A state must manage the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of
its goods and services at home and in the international community. The PM suggests that the
only economic policies that are seen as viable are those that promote the capitalist system and
free, open markets. The term 'Free Trade' represents a number of economic policies that
"expand the rights of multinational corporations and investors to operate in more locations, under
fewer regulations, with less commitment to any specific location" (Juhasz, 2006, p.4).
Advocates of the free market system contend that companies and individuals can amass greater
wealth and spur economic growth when they are free of government regulations (Juhasz, 2006).
The increased wealth created will filter down through the economy to the masses, therefore
benefiting all. Critics of the free trade system refer to these same policies as 'corporate
globalization' and suggest that the wealth created only adds to the wealth of elites and rarely
benefits society at large (Juhasz, 2006). Under corporate globalization, governments are
restricted from implementing policies that protect small local business, workers, or the
environment, in favour of programs that benefit multinational corporations. Often these
strategies result in increased inequality within nations, great social economic gaps between
nations, job loss, poverty and disease (Juhasz, 2006).
The changes that Chavez made to Venezuela's internal economic policies are often
blamed as one of the factors that led certain sectors of the population to support a coup. Many of
the articles published in the NYT during the coup contained statements like, "Mr. Chavez's leftleaning economic policies and autocratic style [have] antagonized much of the business class"
(Rohter, 2002, p.A9). Coverage of Chavez's economic policies insinuated that Chavez "has not
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been able to deliver the prosperity and higher living standards that they [he] had promised his
countrymen" (Rohter, 2002, p.A9). The GM acknowledges that Venezuela was "the world's
fourth-largest oil exporter with some of the worst poverty in the Americas" (Ceaser, 2002[a],
p.Al). Discussion of Chavez's economic achievements were slightly more positive in the GM.
On April 13 th, Mike Ceaser described Chavez as "a charismatic man capable not only of
provocative acts but of real achievements" and suggested that Chavez had "accomplished many
things that won general support" (Ceaser, 2002[a], p.Al). Unfortunately, neither Ceaser nor his
colleagues found it important to ever elaborate on Chavez's many social successes.
Despite the slight differences in coverage, there was no discussion about the need for a
change in policy to reduce the poverty figures or to service the country's poor majority. In fact,
there was little mention of the country's outrageous poverty figures. Neither paper discussed the
specific nature of Chavez's economic polices, or their positive social impact, therefore lacking
the full context necessary for readers to make a meaningful evaluation. Completely absent from
the coverage was how Chavez's 'left-leaning' economic policies led to higher literacy and
increased enrolment in schools, better access to social programs, affordable food, and health
care. As Michael Parenti (2005) notes,
Before Chavez, most of the poor had never seen a doctor or dentist.

Their

children never went to school, since they could not afford the annual fees. The
neo-liberal market "adjustments" of the 1980s and 1990s only made things worse,
cutting social spending and eliminating subsidies in consumer goods. Successive
administrations did nothing about the rampant corruption and nothing about the
growing gap between rich and poor (p.2).
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Most insidious in the media coverage was the lack of analysis about how previous free market
policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank exacerbated poverty in Venezuela long before
Chavez became president.
Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones - The "Leftist" Label

In his article, Good Things happening in Venezuela, Michael Parenti defines a leftist as
"someone who advocates a more equitable distribution of social and human services and who
supports the kinds of programs that the Chavez government has put in place" (Parenti, 2005, p.
4). Huckin (2005) warns against the power of labels in his analysis of Critical Discourse
Analysis (CDA) by stating that "labels often carry unavoidable connotations" (p.8). Within
mainstream media, the label "leftist" tends to be associated with negative connotations. In the
media coverage of Hugo Chavez, the term 'leftist' is seldom defined allowing this label to
remain ambiguous. In other instances, it is used in a pejorative sense "which precludes rational
examination of its political content" (Parenti, 2005, p.4). According to the PM's anticommunist
filter the term 'leftist' generally refers to someone opposed to the neoliberal agenda and therefore
will be viewed negatively by the media.
Both the NYT and the GM often mentioned Chavez's close relationship to Fidel Castro.
A GM article alluded to the fact that Chavez was making enemies with Washington by "cozying
up to Cuba," "making friendly visits to Iraq and Libya" and by "appearing to sympathize" with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Ceaser, 2002[a], Al). Juan Forero of the
NYT described Chavez's relationship with Fidel Castro as a "close friend" and suggested that he

has made an "alliance" with the FARC (2002U], p.A.3). By highlighting Chavez's relationship
with Fidel Castro the media have attempted to draw a parallel between Chavez's Bolivarian
Revolution and communist Cuba. The insinuation seems to be that Chavez has tried to model
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himself after a communist leader and has attempted to turn Venezuela into a communist state.
With the fall of the Soviet Union communism has been associated with a failed economic
system. Drawing a connection between Hugo Chavez's government and communism is an
attempt to cast the Venezuelan political project in a negative light. In addition, the United States
had identified Iraq as a 'terrorist state' prior to the US-led invasion and the FARC has been
added to the list of international 'terrorist' organizations. By stating that Chavez was
sympathetic to the FARC is to suggest that Chavez was willing to cooperate with 'terrorist'
entities. This insinuation would have powerful implications in a country where the leader
equates any opposition to the American military agenda as being part of, or sympathetic to, an
'axis of evil.' The framing of the coverage linking Chavez to communist countries and 'terrorist'
organizations subtly suggests an ideological link between the two, insinuating that states that are
communist are also terrorist.

"Lack" of democracy
Democracy, its definition and implementation are important themes that emerged during
the initial reading of newspaper articles surrounding the coup. According to the anti-communist
filter, judgements regarding whether a person is, or acts, in a democratic way are closely aligned
with American foreign policy objectives. Those that are supported by the American government
are by default democratic, while those opposed are labelled as 'undemocratic' or 'authoritarian.'
In the post 9/11 world, this type of polarized discourse has intensified. Many will recall George
W. Bush's statements to the rest of the world after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, you're
either 'with us' or 'against us.' As suspected, the discussion of "democracy" and the Venezuelan
coup follow this same pattern. Chavez quickly foll out of favour after his election due to his
criticism of the American empire's role in world affairs and due to his role in re-establishing

58

OPEC quotas. Chavez and his supporters are labelled 'undemocratic' while his opponents are
depicted as champions of 'pro-democratic' and 'pro-west' governance (Parenti, 2005).
The U.S. has attempted to portray the Chavez government as authoritarian and
undemocratic despite the fact that major decisions regarding the state have been put to popular
referendum reaffirming the Bolivarian agenda through electoral processes. Chavez himself has
been re-elected three times during regularly scheduled national elections and won a recall
referendum by a clear majority. Venezuelan elections have been subject to regular monitoring
by international observers, including the Carter Centre, which has deemed elections 'free and
fair' (James, 2006). Besides the political reform that has taken place under the new constitution,
Chavez has undertaken other efforts to ensure universal access to democracy. Venezuela's
massive education initiatives have restructured learning and taught 1.5 million people to read
allowing previously illiterate adults access to the political process (James, 2006). Landed
immigrants who had resided in Venezuela for many years faced political and bureaucratic
barriers to citizenship. Under the government campaign of naturalization these long time
residents were provided proper identification cards necessary to gain access to the voting
process.
There is tremendous irony in allowing the Bush Administration to set the world agenda
for democracy. George Bush Jr. 's first election campaign was marred with controversy and
allegations of cheating. Secondly, the United States ranks 20 out of 21 in low voter turnout
among 'established democracies' (Quirk, 2008). Average voter turnout rates are (depending on
the formula used) approximately 50-55 percent for presidential contests and lower for
Congressional races (Quirk, 2008). Despite the American policy of "democracy promotion"
abroad, domestically these figures have not changed in over twenty years when the
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Congressional Research Service did a study on voter turnout for citizens of voting age, in
presidential elections (Quirk, 2008).
There are key discursive differences in the terms used by the NYT to describe Hugo
Chavez, the democratically elected president, and Pedro Carmona, the interim coup leader.
Chavez is consistently described as "mercurial," "a firebrand," "autocratic" and "strong-willed"
in addition to other terms denoting aggression (Banerjee, 2002[c], p.Al; Fonero, 2002[j], p.A3;
2002[d], pA9). The term 'mercurial' is particularly telling as it denotes a tendency toward
erratic and unpredictable changes in mood. A firebrand is defined as one that "creates unrest or
strife" often in the process of aggressively promoting a cause (Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, 2008). In many of the NYTpieces Chavez's military background is hightlighted,
often preceding statements of his previous coup attempt, suggesting that Chavez was willing to
take power by any means. The colourful descriptors used to depict President Chavez are used to
a lesser degree by the GM reporters. The GM tended to have less of a focus on Chavez's
supposed character traits. In addition, the GMs discussion of Chavez's military time was
somewhat more positive. In one article Chavez's was quoted referencing himself as "the
people's soldier" (Ceaser, 2002[a], p.Al).
Conversely, the NYTs portrayed Pedro Carmona as a level headed manager and a
conciliator. On the day following the coup, Christopher Toothhaker of the GM took considerable
space outlining what seemed to be Carmona's resume. Carmona's educational credentials, his
dedication to private enterprise, and political experience as head of the Foreign Ministry's
Economic Policy Directorate are all outlined. Toothhaker used a quote from Carmona's
colleague who described him as "a balanced and intelligent man, a leader, who knows how to
resolve problems" (Toothhaker, 2002, p.Al l).
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There are clear implications about leadership ability that underlie the antithetical
descriptions of Hugo Chavez and Pedro Carmona. The message that the reader is left with, is
that although the presidency changed hands via a coup, citizens were better served under a more
able, reasoned leader. The potential impact of this type of coverage is to reduce international
outrage toward the overthrow of a democratic government.
Democracy and Freedom of Press

Key elements of a functioning democracy are freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. Media reports suggest that Chavez "outraged Venezuelans when he ordered five
television stations shut down, charging that they were inciting violence by broadcasting news
about the protests" (Forero, 2002[g], p.Al). Note the placement of sentences in the April 13th,
2002 article published in the NYT:
Thursday when armed Chavez supporters fired on peaceful strikers, killing at least
10 and injuring hundreds. Mr Chavez's response was characteristic. He forced
five private television stations off the air for showing pictures of the massacre
(Hugo Chavez Departs, 2002, p.Al6).
The combination and sequence of these sentences frame the discussion in a way that insinuates it
was Chavez's allies who incited the violence, which has been proven not to be the case, and that
he was trying to hide that fact from being aired on television (Power, D. et al, 2002).
There was similar coverage regarding the temporary closure of the five private television
stations in the GM. Jorge Rueda (2002) wrote that the five television stations were closed for
"allegedly abusing freedom of expression by inciting opposition protests" (p.Al4). Although
Rueda addresses the issues of the television stations' abuse of power the modality demonstrated
by the use of the word 'allegedly' denotes uncertainty. Further, omitted from the coverage of
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either paper was the link between the private media and the opposition. In Venezuela, private
television stations are owned by wealthy families who have a financial interest in seeing
Chavez's ouster (Klein, 2003). Gustavo Cisneros, owner of Venevision, one of the nation's most
watched stations, played an active role in the campaign against Chavez. Cisneros is known to
have been a part of the group of coup plotters who met with American officials in the months
leading up to the coup. On the night before the coup, Cisneros' station hosted a key meeting of
the coup plotters including Pedro Carmona (Klein, 2003 ). In addition, Cisneros was one of the
signatories of the 'Carmona Decree'.
In the days prior to the coup all four private televisions stations, Venevision, RCTV,
Globovision and Televen, attempted to incite chaos and violence by replacing regular
programming with anti-Chavez speeches and coverage. 'Commericals', sponsored by the oil
industry, were disguised as 'public service announcements' that called for viewers to take to the
streets, with slogans like: "Not one step backward. Out! Leave now!" (Klein, 2003). When a
U.S. affiliate station had confirmed that Chavez had not resigned, and that he had been
kidnapped and jailed, the stations actively suppressed this news. Media stations intentionally
blocked information regarding the overwhelming reaction of Chavez' s followers and their
protests for his return. When the coup had been reversed and Chavez returned to the presidential
palace, private stations began a news blackout and stopped covering the events altogether. On
one of the most important days of Venezuela's history, private stations chose to air American
movies and cartoons.
By comparison, one must wonder if the situation were reversed, what type of legal action
would be faced by American television stations that broadcast 'public service announcements'
which called for citizens to overthrow the democratically elected government. Having
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knowledge of the private media's inflammatory role in attempting to incite a coup is essential to
understanding Chavez's reasons for ordering them off the air. Without this knowledge and
contextualization Chavez's actions seem to be an abuse of presidential power and an assault on
the freedom of the press.

Change of leadership-not a coup?
A NYT article published on April 13 th, illustrates the way in which articles were framed to
background the democratic processes of the state in order to justify a change in leadership. The
article includes the statement that Carmona "was installed today as president of an interim
government that succeeded President Hugo Chavez" (Forero, 2002[ e]. p.A9). The terms
'interim' and 'succeeded' help to background the fact that Carmona took over in a coup against a
democratically elected government. The NYT reporter begins the article with the sentence "In
one day, the man in charge of the presidential palace went from a strong-willed populist known
for his rambling speeches to a mild-mannered businessman who chooses every word carefully"
(Forero, 2002[e], p.A9). Carmona was cited as promising "freedom, pluralism and respect for
the state oflaw" (Forero, 2002[e], p.A9). Carmona's links to the Venezuelan country's rich
colonial elite were downplayed and he was described as a self-made-businessman. The article
credits Carmona as having the potential to mend the gulf between the rich and the poor.
The GM quotes Army General Efrain Vasquez, who says, "It wasn't a coup. It wasn't
insubordination [by the military]. It was an act of solidarity with the Venezuelan people"
(Toothhaker, 2002, p.Al 1). There seems a real hesitancy by the media to use the term 'coup' in
its proper context. The GM did report that Carmona's appointment was challenged by
"Venezuela's Attorney-General as unconstitutional and several Latin American nations
condemned Mr. Chavez's ouster" (Ceaser, 2002[a], p.Al). Additionally, the prospect of
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Carmona's leadership was presented in less glowing terms than what was reported in the NYT.
Although Carmona's business credentials were discussed, the GM reported that Carmona was a
"political novice" (Ceasar, 2002[a], p.Al).
The NYT presents Carmona as the person who can restore order and democracy, yet, this
is a complete contradiction to the actual events that were taking place at the time. Carmona
signed an act of transitional government on April 12th, known as the 'Carmona Decree,' which
was not reported in that day's NYT. This act dissolved the National Assembly and the Supreme
Court, while suspending the Attorney General, Controller General, governors and mayors elected
during the Chavez administration. In addition, the 'Carmona Decree' was responsible for
undoing many of the laws passed under Chavez; of particular interest was Carmona' s intention to
defy OPEC quotas. In the span of one day, Carmona effectively disbanded the structure of the
country's political framework. The 'Carmona Decree' and its potential impacts were not
reported in the NYT until well after the coup had been reversed and Chavez was back in power.
Despite the fact that 'Carmona Decree' was discussed on April 13th in the GM, the consequences
of such an aggressive act were not highlighted. Instead the reporter stated that "Venezuela will
return to a bicameral legislature under the previous constitution" (Toothhaker, 2002, p.Al l).
Abrogating the constitution and other important state bodies was an unnecessary and an extreme
act, especially coming from someone presumably interested in cooperation and reconciliation.
Once the coup was reversed, it was the GM that was the most critical of Carmona's actions. Paul
Knox's article of April 17th stated that "In less than 48 hours as 'president' of Venezuela, Pedro
Carmona Estanga made the eccentric Hugo Chavez Frias look like a paragon of constitutional
democracy" (Knox, 2002 [c], p.A 19). Later in the article, he chastised Carmona for suspending
the constitution calling it an "act so contemptuous of democratic continuity that even Mr. Chavez
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had never dared to carry them out" (Knox, 2002[c], p.Al9). Although these statements are a
backhanded compliment to Chavez at least they addressed Carmona's undemocratic actions.
Chavez took over the presidency of the country in a democratic election in 1998.

The

description of Chavez as an 'undemocratic' leader runs counter to the fact that his political
agenda has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions via various democratic processes. Chavez
encouraged popular participation in the Bolivarian agenda advocating for a popular, democratic
socialism. Shortly after his election, Chavez initiated the process to write a new constitution. A
vote as to whether or not a constitutional assembly should be struck was put to the people. An
election to determine the delegates who would be responsible for this task followed. An open
and participatory process was used to write the new constitution whereby individuals and social
groups were encouraged to submit articles for consideration. Once the new constitution was
written it was ratified by popular vote of the country's citizens. These facts are absent in the
coverage by the NYTand are only mentioned briefly in one GM article. An autocratic or antidemocratic leader would not have allowed for such an important process to be decided by the
people.
The constitution itself contains provisions for citizens participation in the affairs of the
country. In regards to democratizing the economy, Chavez has promoted a 'social economy'
which encompasses five closely interrelated programs of wealth redistribution (via land reform
programs and social policies), promotion of cooperatives, creation of indigenous development,
industrial co-management, and social production enterprises (Wilper, 2007). Although there
have been critiques of the constitution regarding the renewed powers of the president, previously
discussed in chapter 1, we can see that procedurally Chavez has followed the principles of a free,
open and democratic society.
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We can see the influence of the anti-communist filter in the definition of what does and
what does not constitute a coup d'etat. A coup is not 'technically' a coup if it is against an
ideological enemy of the neoliberal agenda or the U.S. state. In this case, a coup was described
as a change in leadership that was justified. The coup against Chavez was presented as his fault
due to his commitment to populist policies. Pedro Carmona, who represents business interests,
was presented as the person who could mediate the chaotic political situation. It seems that the
message was that only a return to a business agenda could restore peace and security.
U.S. involvement -Who supported the coup?

Articles published during the coup insinuated that Carmona and his 'interim' government
acted autonomously with support from the military due to internal unrest within Venezuela. The
NYT did not uncover evidence of U.S. interference until days after the coup was reversed.
Statements that were reported took on various degrees of certainty as to the role played by the
American government. Instead of doing some hard investigative journalism, the media repeated
positions given by unnamed American administrators. The NYT reported that an unnamed
Defence Department official stated "We were not discouraging people, we were sending
informal, subtle signals that we don't like this guy. We didn't say, NO, don't you dare, and we
didn't advocate saying Here's some arms; we'll help you overthrow this guy. We were not
doing that" (Marquis, 2002, p.A 10). Absent from this discussion were questions as to whether
the United States had the legitimate right to interfere in the political landscape of a sovereign
country. The dominance of the American empire and their right to maintain world order is
presupposed in the discussion.
The Canadian coverage, in the GM, addressed some important points in regards to
American interference in Latin America. However, this came in the form of a column written by
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Rick Salutin who suggested that "it's all standard, like U.S.-backed coups in Guatemala (1954)
or Chile (1973)--down to the pot-banging street protests and U.S.-allied labour leaders. They all
come from the same coup cookie-cutter" (Salutin, 2002, p.Al 7). Salutin's article questioned
whether American officials were involved or had knowledge of the coup. His statement that
"The Pentagon spokesperson said she was 'not aware' if the U.S. gave military support to the
coup" expressed his disbelief (Salutin, 2002, p.A 17).
The framing of the coverage left the reader unclear as to the extent of American
involvement in the coup plot. Except for the comments made regarding previous American-led
coups, there was a lack of historical discussion presented concerning America's imperialist role
in other Latin American countries. Investigative journalism would have uncovered hard and fast
facts besides clandestine meetings, such as direct funding via the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED). Eva Gallinger (2008) sums this up in her book Bush vs. Chavez by
concluding,
Venezuela's turmoil has been created in large part by the work of the NED and
USAID and their overseers.

Similar to its role in Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti,

Panama, and the Philippines, among other nations, the United States has applied
its successful model of 'democracy intervention,' which has involved the filtering
of funds into opposition groups and political parties and the essential political
training that enables its counterparts to successfully obtain their objective (p. 22).
As previously discussed, the American government gave substantial amounts of money to
anti-Chavez groups through the NED and its branch organizations. Aid was given to groups in
all sectors of the Venezuelan political landscape, from unions to groups proposing to 'promote
democracy.' The amount of money that the NED allocated for Venezuela skyrocketed in the
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years immediately preceding the coup attempt from $200,000 in 2000 to about $4 million in
2002 (James, 2006). Besides direct NED funding, NED subsidiaries saw their Venezuelan
budgets increase. One example is the Republican arm of the NED, the IRI, which had a budget
of $50,000 in 2000, which mushroomed to $340,000 after George Bush's election in 2000
(James, 2006). The funds were allocated for training new or existing political parties on party
structure, management and coalition building (James, 2006). One must ask, why is the American
government funding opposition political parties in a sovereign foreign country? The pattern of
funding and its distribution to opposition groups illustrates a calculated attempt to undermine the
democratically elected government of Hugo Chavez.
There are also credible reports of American direct military involvement in the coup. "A
STRATFOR intelligence brief claims, from unnamed sources, that the CIA and the State
Department were both involved offering direct support to coup-plotters" (Broderick, 2002, p. 2).
According to National Security Agency (NSA) officers, U.S. army units were present in
Venezuela and provided communications intelligence to U.S. military and national command
authorities on the progress of the coup (Broderick, 2002). The fact that there was direct military
involvement preceding the coup rebuts the American government claims that they did not know
of an impending coup and did not have any direct participation.

Events occurring during the coup
Violence by Chavez's supporters is cited as the incident that caused the military to seize
control of country and restore order. A NYT article reported that television broadcasts during the
coup showed "several men in plain clothes firing semiautomatic handguns from a bridge over a
busy street in downtown Caracas. Among the crowd of assailants were people in red berets and
T-shirts bearing the name of Mr. Chavez's movement" (Forero, 2002[d], p.A9). The GM
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recounts the situation with less certainty, stating that there were shooting deaths that occurred
outside the presidential palace "apparently by snipers loyal to Mr. Chavez" (Cesaer, 2002 [a],
p.Al). The use of the word 'apparently' illustrates a different use of modality than the coverage
of the NYT. However, the documentary film The Revolution Will Not Be Televised contains
controversial footage of Chavez's supporters being the ones shot at by the rooftop snipers.
/

Private media channels captured the Chavistas returning fire from the ground level and used this
snapshot of film in an attempt to mislead the public into believing Chavez's supporters were
inciting violence. The film's footage suggests that the snipers were agent provocateurs who shot
into the crowd in an attempt to discredit Chavez's supporters, show that Chavez had lost control
of the country and create the chaos necessary to justify a coup d'etat.
In both the NYT and the GM, Chavez's supporters are consistently labelled as 'the poorest
classes," "protestors" and "militants." The use of these descriptive terms have a particular
connotation which marginalized Chavez' s supporters. J oumalists did not choose to use words
like 'citizens,' the 'public' or the 'people' which would express the Chavistas majority status.
The media coverage rarely acknowledged that the "poorest classes" made up 80 percent of the
population and therefore that Chavez had the support of a great number of citizens.
The voices of Chavez's supporters were all but totally absent in the newspaper coverage
of the coup. There were virtually no direct quotes from ordinary citizens that expressed their
opinions of the political events. The discussions of economic policy did not contain any
reactions from ordinary citizens who were most affected by Chavez's initiatives. Furthermore,
there was no evidence that any of the reporters attempted to find out what the will of the people
was during the coup. The majority of quoted statements came from government officials or the
business class. Not only did this foreground the concerns of the elites, it also forced the reader to
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understand the perspective of Chavez's supporters as interpreted through reporters. In the case
of the NYT, it was not until the reversal of the coup that Chavez's supporters were finally quoted
verbatim and in that instance they were shouting slogans of support, i.e. "the people are with
Chavez!" (Thompson, 2002, p.Al O; Forero, 2002[i], p.A3).

Chavez Reinstated- An Apologetic Tone
Of all the press coverage that took place at the time of the coup, the NYT articles
surrounding Chavez's return to power were the most insidious. The Venezuelan people with the
aid of the military, were able to reverse the coup in less than 48 hours. This may have been the
first time in history that a coup was reversed. One would expect that the media coverage would
take on a more celebratory tone and that the coup reversal would vindicate the elected leader.
Instead, what I found was that the coverage was framed to place Chavez in an apologetic
position, insinuating his policies or actions were responsible for the coup. The NYT went to great
lengths to describe the ways that Chavez was prepared to appease the business community.
Chavez was described as a "changed man" who "showed none of the combative, demagogic
style that brought thousands of Venezuelans into the streets" (Venezuela's political, 2002,
p.A26). Portraying Chavez as a remorseful man insinuated that he had initially made a mistake
in pursuing 'leftist' social policies despite the resistance of the business community. The fact
that Chavez made it clear that he continued to "be in charge and that he was not prepared to alter
the course of his populist revolution" although briefly mentioned was essentially backgrounded
in the discussion (Forero, 2002[b ]), p.Al 0).
Overall, the GM coverage also took a conciliatory tone, with the difference being that
direct quotes selected focused on peace and unity over alleged misguided policies. Reporter
James Anderson quoted Chavez as saying "I call upon Venezuelans, all Venezuelans, to reunite,
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to reflect. I want to hear from opposition leaders" (Anderson, 2002, p.A14). In general, articles
in the GM gave the sense that Chavez was ready to cooperate but there was little mention of the
fact that he did not plan to substantially change his political and economic agenda.
An article published May 3rd, 2002 was the first one to discuss Venezuela in relation to
Canadian foreign policy. The reporter questioned whether Canada should support a coup d'etat
and, more specifically, mildly challenged the American's stance toward Chavez. Columnist Paul
Knox asked the question "Do we only support democratic rule when it's convenient?" (Knox,
2002[a], p.A13). He criticized the position of Angel Rabasa, an analyst for the private Rand
Corporation think tank, who believed supporting the Carmona government would be a "rapid
return to real democracy" (Knox, 2002[a], p.Al3). According to Knox, if Canada was to support
this position it would be a "180 degree about face" from the adoption of the agreement among
nations of the Americas to "stand against illegal regimes" (Knox, 2002[a], p.A13). Both Canada
and the U.S. were signatories to the agreement. The article insinuated that having signed such an
agreement it would be ludicrous to then "wink at a military takeover if we happen to like the
result" (Knox, 2002[a], p.Al3).
While discussing the coup's impact on oil prices, Nellea Banerjee, a reporter for the NYT
described Chavez's return as "continuing political instability" (2002[a], p.A8). Chavez was
blamed for the polarization of the country's social classes, rich and poor. Statements like
"Chavez must change his confrontational style and inflammatory rhetoric, which encouraged
class polarization," illustrated this point (McCoy, 2002, p.A27). In fact, it was not Chavez's
speeches that caused the polarization of the classes. This was a pre-existing condition in a
1

country where 80 percent of the citizens lived in poverty. A piece published on April 16 \
indicated that "the only hope for Chavez and Venezuela is for him to step back from his
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confrontational agenda" (Venezuela's political, 2002, p.A26). This type of argumentation
suggested that the only thing that would bring stability to Venezuela was if Chavez became less
aggressive in battling poverty and restored things to a status quo benefiting elites.
By April I ih, the NYT was already predicting another coup and highlighting elite
criticisms of Chavez. Anti-Chavez forces had begun to call for more street protests to force the
president to resign. There was a sole quote from a Chavez supporter who claimed that they
(Chavez's opponents), insisted on "conspiring" to take out President Chavez and establish "their
own government." The supporter added that the people "would not permit a government without
Chavez" (Marquis, 2002, p.A 10). Instead of focusing on the plans that Chavez had to restore the
country to order, the media highlighted the potential for instability. NYTreporter, Juan Forero,
insinuated that "the military remain deeply divided and perhaps prone to participating in a
popular uprising like the one last Thursday that temporarily removed Mr. Chavez" (Forero,
2002[a], p.A8). It may have been the case that the military was divided, but it was also the
military that helped to restore Chavez to the presidency.
Brief Overview of Findings
The articles surrounding the actual coup appear to be in line with American foreign
policy toward Venezuela, particularly those published in the NYT. Coverage of the coup in the
GM mirrored the NYT with few significant differences. The GM was slightly more critical of

opposition forces and gave Chavez some credit for economic policy changes that benefited the
poor. Overall, both papers fell in line with what the PM theorizes would be found in
mainstream media coverage of international events.
Structurally, I have found that the GM focused their reports on actual events as they
unfolded and contained less political commentary. That said, the GM followed closely the
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register that one would expect to find in a corporate newspaper's discussion of foreign affairs.
The NYT published articles that were longer and presented a more subjective and detailed
account of the situation, containing a larger degree of political opinion and interpretation by
reporters. It should be noted that Canadian coverage tended to rely on private news providers or
'news wires.' The majority of articles published in the GM were derived from the Associated
Press, Reuter News Agency, Bloomberg Business News, and the Dow Jones Service.
Conversely, the NYT did not seem to rely as much on news wire services.
Regarding the content of the published articles, my analysis has found that
contextualization and framing of the events occurring during the coup and of Chavez's actions
favoured elite interpretation. The polarized socio-economic condition of the country was not
discussed in a way that emphasized the need for change. It seems ludicrous that a country rich in
oil resources should continue to follow policies that have resulted in 80 percent of the people
living in poverty. Underling the discussion of economic policy is the need to embrace the free
market system. Chavez's economic policies are an alternative to the neoliberal agenda and
therefore tended to be discredited in the media coverage. Furthermore, it was Chavez's
initiatives which were blamed for polarizing the society and creating divisions amongst the
classes.
Most glaring in both papers was the omission of any relevant details that may have
implicated the U.S. in supporting the coup. There is strong evidence that the U.S. sponsored the
coup financially, via the NED, and offered political assistance, evident in the numerous meetings
with coup plotters. This is an overarching political detail that was not mentioned to any
significant degree in the GM or NYT print coverage.
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CHAPTER4
CONCLUSION

I don't care what the facts are'. What a perfect maxim for the New American
Empire. Perhaps a slight variation on the theme would be more apposite: ' The
facts can be whatever we want them to be. (Roy, A, 2003, para7).
This study used both critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the propaganda model (PM)
to systematically analyze print media coverage concerning the April 2002 coup against Hugo
Chavez. The PM proposes that "propaganda campaigns can only occur when they are consistent
with the interests of those controlling and managing the filters" (Herman, 2003, p. 2). The model
predicts that the mainstream media will frame the news and restrict debate to parameters that fall
within the framework of acceptable elite perspectives (Herman, 2003). Furthermore, according
to the propaganda model, the media will tend to "serve elite interests uncompromisingly" when
elites are unified on an issue that common citizens are either unaware of or have become
inundated with elite perspectives (Herman, 2003, p.2).
Herman and Chomsky propose that news items pass through certain filters resulting in a
sanitized version of the news that is suitable for public consumption. Due to increased
corporatization and concentration of the media we can see that the PM filters of ownership and
advertising have become more important when analyzing the media. The establishment of public
relations firms and the dominance of right-wing think tanks have added to the credibility of the
third and fourth filters, namely flak and sourcing. However, one of the most powerful media
filters in regards to changing people's thinking and indoctrinating them with neo-liberal values,
via the media, is the fifth filter. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, I focused mainly on
the fifth filter in relation to media coverage of the 2002 coup in Venezuela.
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With the end of the cold war, one might conclude that anti-communism, would be less
influential as a filter. However, if we expand our understanding of what has come to constitute
the anti-communist filter, arguably that is not the case. Following Herman (2003), I have
attempted to demonstrate that while there are still -in some instances - overt references to the
evils of "communism" in some media coverage of Hugo Chavez, the filter has undergone
/

significant changes insofar as anyone or any nation that dares to defy neoliberalism and the
"Washington consensus" is often characterized as "anti-democratic." The expanded fifth filter as
explained by Herman (2003 )has come to represent the "ideological force of the belief in the
'miracle of the market"' (p. 8).
As capitalism has progressed to dominance on the stage of world politics, we can see the
relevance of the expanded fifth filter. The ideological and profit driven goals of capitalism have
been 'globalized' by American imperialism and American foreign policy.

Arhundhati Roy

(2004) describes the "New Imperialist' world order by stating that
for the first time in history, a single empire with an arsenal of weapons that could
obliterate the world in an afternoon has complete, unipolar, economic and military
hegemony. It uses different weapons to break open different markets. There isn't
a country on God's earth that is not caught in the cross-hairs of the American
cruise missile and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] checkbook (para 3).
In so-called democratic and free countries one would assume that the people drive and inspire
the nation's agenda and foreign policy objectives. We would expect a nation, like the United
States which heralds itself as a beacon of "democracy," "freedom" and "human rights" would

'

aspire to spread 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' to all the world's peoples. However,
when we peek behind the curtain, we find that "democracy" has too often been conflated with
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American-led "capitalism" and that the wizard controlling the levers of American foreign policy
(and indeed media coverage of it) represents corporate interests rather than democratic
imperatives.
The corporate media have not only supported the neo-liberal agenda, they have become
part of the neo-liberal project (Roy, 2004). Political Scientist Joseph Nye originally coined the
term 'soft power' to describe the ability to influence "without any explicit threat or exchange" to
"persuade [one] to go along with your purposes" or to "engender cooperation" (Nye, 2004, para
12). 'Soft power' influence is gained not through force or monetary incentive but through
"attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those
values" (Nye, 2004, para 12). Traditionally, 'soft power' stood for diplomatic efforts made
toward foreign countries, such as food aid, broadcasts, cultural exchanges or other government
sponsored programs (Bruno, 2008). Domestically, the corporate media have become a part of
the 'soft power' strategy that is used by the state to influence public opinion. This 'weapon of
mass deception' is used against both foreign and domestic citizens to manipulate them into being
receptive to the political goals of the American empire.
James Petras (2008) theorizes that the attacks against Chavez by "imperial academic
advisors, media experts and ideologues" are a form of "ideological-political warfare" (Petras,
2008, US Venezuela Relations, para 6). He describes the type of propaganda and social
organizing that has taken place as a 'soft power' strategy which is meant to create the optimal
conditions for the use of 'hard power' a combination of "military intervention, coup d'etat,
terror, sabotage, or regional war" (Petras, 2008, US Venezuela Relations, para 7). It is under the
heading of 'soft power' that the media campaign against Chavez falls and must be analyzed. The
Bush administration through its actions and the comments of government officials, has supported
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and encouraged certain myths about Chavez's Venezuela. The media coverage of the
Venezuelan coup reflects these myths which can be summarized under three main categories: (i)
Venezuela as an undemocratic country ruled by a tyrant; (ii) Chavez as sympathizer of terrorists
and the conflation of terrorism with socialism; (iii) Chavez's economic policies as
"antidemocratic" because they challenge neoliberalism. An updated and expanded
conceptualization of the fifth filter predicts how the mainstream media will discuss these issues
from a position that privileges neoliberal ideology and corporate interests.
'Soft Power' Myths Operating in Venezuela

Democracy, the modem world's holy cow, is in crisis. And the crisis is a profound
one. Every kind of outrage is being committed in the name of democracy. It has
become little more than a hollow word, a pretty shell, emptied of all content or
meaning. It can be whatever you want it to be. Democracy is the Free World's
whore, willing to dress up, dress down, willing to satisfy a whole range of taste,
available to be used and abused at will (Roy, 2003, para 40).
The Bush administration has attempted to portray Chavez as an undemocratic and
authoritarian leader and this label has been generally reflected in the mainstream media. When
we analyze the media coverage, what we find is a manipulation of the term "democracy". As
Roy (2003) suggests, "democracy has become Empire's euphemism for neo-liberal capitalism"
(para 45). The definition of democracy is heavily influenced by market driven ideologies and, in
many cases, has become confused with one's ability to consume, the availability of goods and
having multiple consumer choices. In addition, democratic processes have been measured
against Western and predominantly American standards. While even authoritarian regimes have,
in the past, been called "democratic" if they have allied with Westem and American interests,
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this has become even more predominant in the post-9/11 world. For the Bush administration,
any leader (such as Chavez) who challenges American imperial foreign policy and questions the
efficacy of unfettered neoliberal economic policies is deemed "undemocratic" and by definition
"pro-terrorist." The Bush administration pretends to be concerned with democracy and human
rights in Venezuela, when in fact its real concern is the possible erosion of the free market
system currently in place in Latin America.
An analysis of the Venezuelan political landscape reveals a functioning democracy which
has taken structural and cultural steps toward becoming a 'participatory democracy.' When
compared to other Latin American nations, Venezuelans are more likely than citizens of the
other 18 Latin American nations polled, to describe their government as "totally democratic"
(James, 2006). Venezuelans have the second highest level of satisfaction with their country's
democratic system rating it on average a 7.6 out of 10, substantially higher than the regional
average of 5.5 (James, 2006). Of course, public sentiments in countries such as Venezuela do
not factor into the characterizations made by the Bush administration nor do they typically
register in the media coverage of events in that country. Instead, "countries that receive the
democratic stamp of approval correlate highly with those that agree with U.S. foreign policy
goals in the region, particularly the promotion of the neo-liberal economic model and military
cooperation" (James, 2006, Venezuela is a dictatorship para 16).
The mainstream media attempted to present the coup against Chavez as a mere change of
leadership rather than what it was - the overthrow of a democratically elected official. In other
words, a coup is not a coup when it results in the removal of a leader that is not friendly to North
American corporate and political interests. In the case of Chavez, the coup was simply a
'transfer of power' to a more able, level-headed leader due to "widespread public unrest." The
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fact that the "unrest" was fomented, at least in part, by groups (i.e. the NED) funded by the
American government and Venezuelan "elites" rather than the majority of the population was
conveniently ignored.
Based on my research, I have found that a propagandistic portrayal of Chavez and the
Bolivarian initiative does exist. In general, the media coverage in the NYT particularly, and to a
slightly lesser extent in the GM, serves American foreign policy initiatives. The media attempted
to align themselves with American foreign policy through their descriptions of Carmona versus
Chavez, their discussion of Chavez's friendship with Fidel Castro and through their presentation
of the military's concerns about the government. The definition of democracy also affected how
civil democracy and workers' rights were reported. Although employers in the oil industry
actually locked out their workers, it was described by the mainstream media as a strike. In this
case, the employer's interests were in line with the American agenda to remove Chavez from
office. Portraying the workers as supporting the oil executives and willing to go on strike was an
attempt to undermine Chavez's policies to nationalize the state oil company.
In his article "The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective," Herman (2003) predicts that
"the global power of market institutions makes non-market options seem utopian" (p.8). In most
of the media coverage I examined, Chavez's policies were presented as populist, left leaning,
extreme, and, of course, "anti-democratic." Readers were led to believe that anything that did
not correspond to free market imperatives or neoliberal ideological assumptions was "radical,"
unattainable and impractical. In short, the coverage conformed to the mantra so beloved by free
market, capitalist ideologues - "There is No Alternative" (TINA).
One could reasonably argue that all national economic strategies should be populist,
insofar as they would benefit the majority of "the people." Yet, that very idea is presented as
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extreme and undesirable and it appears as though the capitalist agenda defines and determines
whether an economic strategy is viewed as favourable or unfavourable. By the same token, if a
policy benefits big business or elite interests, it is not only presented as positive but as viable and
necessary.
Based on my observations, I have concluded that the PM is still a valid and useful
framework for understanding and analyzing mainstream media coverage. While it is certainly
the case that the global political landscape has changed given the fall of state communism, it is
also the case that the anti-communist filter is still operative- albeit in a slightly modified fashion.
As I noted above, one can still find examples of blatant anti-communism in dominant media and
political discourse; however, the category of anti-communism has been transformed. The evil
empire may be long gone and the "threat" of communism a bygone memory, but those who
challenge American military and corporate hegemony - particularly in the post 9/11 era - are
now swathed in labels such as "anti-democratic" or "pro-terrorist." As the PM suggests, the
societal purpose of the mainstream media is to "inculcate and defend the economic, social and
political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state" (Herman
& Chomsky, 1988 cited in Sparks, 2007, p.75). In the case of Venezuela, where large oil
reserves are concerned, it is in the interests of the elites to have a president that is subservient to
U.S. market and energy interests. Hugo Chavez has proven he is capable of challenging the neoliberal agenda and the American government. Due to Chavez's political positions, it was not
surprising to find corporate media coverage that was critical of the Venezuelan political project
and supportive of the coup against a democratically elected leader.
The corporate media coverage has helped to buoy up myths that have been created in
Washington, to justify US actions against Venezuela. Particularly blatant was the media's lack
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of coverage regarding America's interference in Venezuela. As suggested above, the role played
by the NED in supporting and financing the coup, was only marginally mentioned and that was
well after the coup had been reversed. To my knowledge, the exact nature of NED activities, or
the amounts of money funneled towards undermining Chavez's presidency, has never been
completely revealed in the mainstream media. This, in and of itself, would suggest that the PM
/

still has enormous potential as a conceptual framework for future research on related issues.

Recommendations For Further Study
As a student of critical media studies, I have attempted to add to the body of work that
investigates the reporting of international events in Canadian and American daily newspapers.
The scope of my research was limited to two mainstream daily newspapers, the NYTand the GM
Further study of this topic could build on my research by examining other instances where
Venezuela and/or Chavez figured prominently in the North American media such as when
Chavez appeared before the United Nations in September 2006 and railed against the Bush
administration and its imperialist foreign policy. One could, presumably, also examine how
other nations and/or leaders that have sought to challenge neoliberal economic policies have
been portrayed in the mainstream media.

Implications for Students in the Field of Social Justice
I am certain that when enough of us become aware of how we are exploited by the
economic engine that creates an insatiable appetite for the world's resources, and
results in systems that foster slavery, we will no longer tolerate it.

We will

reassess our role in a world where a few swim in riches and the majority drown in
poverty, pollution and violence. We will commit ourselves to navigating a course
toward compassion, democracy and social justice for all. (Perkins, 2004, p. xiii)
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For students interested in international politics, the political situation in Venezuela is an
exciting example of one nation's pursuit of social and economic justice. For progressives
looking beyond the horizon of what neoliberal capitalism has to offer, it is important to offer
support and encouragement to the Venezuelan people, while at the same time learning from the
initiatives - both those that have been positive and others that may be problematical - that have
been undertaken in that nation for they may provide valuable lessons as we struggle for the
establishment of genuinely democratic institutions in our own comer of the world. Moreover, if
we believe that "democracy" should be something more than the "Empire's euphemism for
neoliberal capitalism" as Roy (2004[b ], p. 56) has so aptly put it, we must draw attention to the
"terror" unleashed by the "market" (Galeano, 2003) and to the role played by American
militarism in enforcing a "neoliberal aganda that wreaks havoc with any semblance of
democracy both at home and abroad" (Scatamburlo-D' Annibale, Suoranta, and McLaren, 2007,
p. 112).
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